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INTRODUCTION

"The Case of the Missing Cable Rate Cuts" is a perplexing
whodunit playing to standing room only crowds in hearing rooms
near you. Accusations fly and suspects abound one year after
Congress passed a sweeping law' to clamp down on cable rates,
with news headlines trumpeting the increasing cost of basic cable
service and the perception in many quarters that cable prices are
not dropping. Did Congress devote years to develop legislation
intended to curb monopoly prices only to write a law that actually
does the opposite? Did the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC or Commission) work around the clock for months promulgating rate regulations2 that unintentionally frustrate the statutory
mandate? Are powerful cable multisystem conglomerates gaming
a regulatory structure they helped design? Are factions in the
industry mounting a public relations campaign and a hardball,
grass-roots political effort designed to kill the new law in its crib?

1. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 521-611
(West Supp. 1993)) (1992 Cable Act or 1992 Act).
2. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.100-.621 (1993); see also In re Implementation of Sections
of the Cable TV Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Rate Reg., Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, 8 FCC Red. 510 (1992) [hereinafter NPRM], amended by
Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 8 FCC Red. 5631
[hereinafter Rate Order] (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 0, 76), aff'd by FirstOrder on
Reconsideration,Second Report and Order,and Third Notice of ProposedRulemaking,
58 Fed. Reg. 46,718 (1993) [hereinafter Rate Order on Reconsideration](to be codified
at 47 C.F.R. pt. 76).
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Are many local cable operators evading the law? Are news
accounts focusing on anomalies and overlooking the overall
savings that consumers are already enjoying? Or, like the solution
to Agatha Christie's most famous mystery, did all the suspects
have a hand in the deed?3
The impetus of the current controversy is all the more curious
in that, as far as can be determined at the time of this writing, the
pattern in recent years of cable prices increasing at multiples of
the Consumer Price Index has been broken. At this early stage of
rate regulation, it is difficult to get a clear picture of the details of
rate trends, and none of the controversial rate changes have been
reviewed formally, much less approved by any regulator. To date,
equipment prices appear to be dropping significantly. Price cuts on
the rates of basic service, however, range from modest to
negligible and many systems have announced large increases in
parts of consumers' overall monthly bills along with new charges
for items not previously billed to customers. Across the country
there remain pockets of potential abuse with which, if illegality is
established, the FCC is equipped to deal. These mild, if not mixed,
results have nevertheless fueled sharp criticism of cable rate
regulation and intense scrutiny of the new regulatory system even
before it is fully operational.4
3. AGATHA CHRISTIE, MURDER ON THE ORIENT EXPRESS (1933) (originally titled
in U.S. editions).
4. See OversightHearingon the Implementation of the Cable Television Consumer
Protectionand Competition Act of 1992 and ProvisionsImplementing Rate Regulation
Before the House Telecommunications and Finance Subcomm., 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(Sept. 28, 1993) [hereinafter Oversight Hearing] (statement of Rep. Edward J. Markey
(D-Mass.), Chairman, House Telecommunications and Finance Subcomm.), (statement
of James H. Quello, Acting Chairman, FCC); see also FCC Fact Sheet on Cable Rate
Adjustments, Public Notice (Aug. 20, 1993) [hereinafter FCC Fact Sheet] (rebutting
news articles suggesting that regulations are causing price increases); Letter from Rep.
Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.), Rep. Christopher Shays (R-Conn.), and 128 members of
Congress to James H. Quello, Acting Chairman, FCC (Sept. 14, 1993) (on file with the
Federal Communications Law Journal) (107 Democrats, 22 Republicans, and 1
Independent signed the letter urging the FCC to reconsider rate regulations immediately);
Letter from Sen. Joseph Lieberman (D-Conn.) to James H. Quello, Acting Chairman,
FCC (Sept. 1, 1993) (on file with the FederalCommunicationsLaw Journal); Ervin S.
Duggan, Commissioner, FCC, Cable Regulation and Boozer's Revisions, Remarks before
the National Association of Telecommunications Officers and Advisors (Sept. 10, 1993)
(transcript on file with the FederalCommunications Law Journal); Letter from James
MURDER ON THE CALAIS COACH
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After concluding a fractious, long struggle over the federal
budget, the members of the 103d Congress welcomed their
delayed 1993 summer recess and a chance to finally turn to
critical policy issues such as implementation of the North
American Free Trade Agreement and the historic debate on health
care reform. Perhaps the last thing legislators expected upon
returning to their districts was "man bites dog" news stories

H. Quello, Acting Chairman, FCC, to Meg Greenfield, Editorial Page Editor, Washington
Post (Aug. 19, 1993) (on file with the FederalCommunicationsLaw Journal)(rebutting
Paul Farhi, Cable Rules Will Raise Some Bills, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1993, at Al).
Controversy over implementation of the 1992 Cable Act is neither unexpected nor
unique to the rate regulation provisions. For example, as many as 1.5 million viewers
were affected by decisions to drop C-SPAN, which local cable operators indicate is
necessary to free up channel space needed to comply with the so-called "must carry"
provisions of the Act that require cable operators to carry certain over-the-air broadcast
signals. Timothy J. Burger, Less Congress on Cable, C-SPAN Warns; 1.5 Million Feel
Cutbacks After Cable Bill, ROLL CALL, Sept. 9, 1992, at 10. Retransmission consent has
the potential to be almost as controversial as cable rates if negotiations and agreements
break down over compensation to be paid to broadcast stations for carriage on cable
systems.
Five lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of 14 different sections of the Act
were filed within days of the bill's enactment and are now awaiting argument in the
Supreme Court. See Discovery Comm., Inc. v. United States, No. 92-2558 (D.D.C. Nov.
5, 1992) (challenging §§ 3, 9, and 19 of the 1992 Cable Act); National Cable TV Ass'n,
Inc. v. United States, No. 92-2495 (D.D.C. Nov. 5, 1992) (challenging §§ 4, 5, and 6 of
the 1992 Cable Act); Time Warner Entertainment Co., L.P. v. FCC, No. 92-2494
(D.D.C. Nov. 5, 1992) (challenging §§ 3, 7(b)(4)(B), 7(c), 9, 10(d), 11, 15, 19, 24, and
25 of the 1992 Cable Act); Daniels Cablevision, Inc. v. United States, No. 92-2292
(D.D.C. Oct. 13, 1992) (challenging the constitutionality of §§ 4, 5, and 6 of the 1992
Cable Act); Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, No. 92-2247 (D.D.C. Oct. 5, 1992)
(challenging the constitutionality of §§ 4, 5, and 6 of the 1992 Cable Act).
All the plaintiffs challenged §§ 4 and 5 of the 1992 Cable Act, the "must carry"
provisions. 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 534, 535 (West Supp. 1993). All five cases were consolidated
as related cases. Thereafter, all the "must carry" claims were severed for hearing, as the
statute requires, by a three-judge district court. Id. § 555; see Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc.
v. FCC, 810 F. Supp. 1308 (D.D.C. 1992). The three-judge district court, in a divided
decision, upheld the "must carry" provisions. Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F.
Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1993), application denied, 113 S. Ct. 1806 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J., as
Circuit Justice) (refusing to enjoin enforcement of §§ 4 and 5 of the 1992 Act). The
constitutionality of the statutory rate regulation provisions was upheld when the
remaining claims were decided in Daniels Cablevision v. United States, No. 92-2292,
1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12806 (D.D.C. Sept. 16, 1993) (Jackson, J.) (upholding 10
sections of the Act, overturning cable multisystem operator (MSO) ownership limits,
public service obligations for direct broadcast satellite, and notice requirements for cable
previews), cert. grantedsub. nom., Turner Brdcst. Sys. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 38 (Sept. 28,
1993).
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suggesting that the 1992 Cable Act was causing cable rate
increases and sharp inquiries from local authorities and consumers
pressing them for an explanation.' Having seemingly just completed years of work on landmark legislation by voting overwhelmingly to enact the 1992 Cable Act over President Bush's
veto, this was, after all, an issue members of Congress might not

5. A sampling of news coverage across the country indicates the scope and
intensity of the present controversy. See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews, G.O.P. Scorches
Democrats Over Rising Cable Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1993, at Cl; Marianne
Ameberg, Cable TV Bills Will Bring Ups and Downs, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 5,
1993, at K3; CableMalarkey, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 1993, at A18 (editorial); Cable Act
Takes Effect, Establishing New Rate Structure for Cable Customers, PR Newswire,
Aug. 25, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File; The Cable Rate Shock,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1993, Al8 (editorial); ConsumerAdvocate Pushes Competition,
DAIL INDEPENDENT (Kannapolis, N.C.), Sept. 2, 1993, at IA; James Cox, FCC Chief.
Too Early to Judge Cable Rates, USA TODAY, Sept. 29, 1993, at 2B; James Cox, Static
Over Cable TV/NVew Rules Won't Lower Rates for All, USA TODAY, Sept. 7, 1993, at
IB; James W. Crawley, Cable TV Complaints Made Easier, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
Sept. 2, 1993, at Cl; Robert D. Davila, Cable Firm Scrambles to Calm Viewers,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 5, 1993, at Al; Farhi, CableRules Will Raise Some Bills,supra
note 4; Paul Farhi, TCI Memo Calledfor PriceHikes, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 1993, at
Cl; Shelby Gilje, Some Mandated Cable StandardsMay Surprise You, SEATTLE TIMES,
Sept. 5, 1993, at L2; Thomas W. Hazlett, Why Your Cable Bill Is So High, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 24, 1993, at A10; Noel Holston, Program Changes; Cable TVRates Rise-and
Fall-in Response to Change in Law, STAR TRMB. (Minneapolis/St. Paul), Aug. 31, 1993,
at IB; Spencer S. Hsu, Cable's New Fees Hold Few Savings; One-Third of TV
Customers Will Pay More, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 1993, at Va2; Josh Hyatt, Some Cable
Customers Turned Off by New Rules, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 2, 1993, at 37; Steve Leer,
Official Attacks Cable Rates, GASTON GAZETrE (Gastonia, N.C.), Sept. 2, 1993, at 2B;
Andrew LePage, Surprise Ending for Cable TV Customers; Rate Regulation Was
Supposed to Cut Monthly Bills. It Willfor Some Subscribers,butfor Others the Charges
Actually Will Go Up, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1993, at JI; Alan Pergament, Cable Act
Causes Local Grief; Ch. 29 Switches 'StarTrek, 'BUFFALO NEWS, Sept. 3, 1993, at 12;
Robert E. Pierre, Cable Rate Changes Run into Little Static; MetroVision, MultiVision
HadBracedforCustomer Outcry, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 1993, at Md5; Mark Robichaux,
How Cable-TV Firms Raised Rates in Wake of Law to Curb Them, WALL ST. J., Sept.
28, 1993, at Al; Michael D. Shear, New Cable Rates Not a Pretty Picture, Consumer
Office Says; Analysis Sought to Determine Whether Increases Comply with FCCRules,
WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 1993, at Va5; Michelle Singletary, Most Cable TV Rates Rise
Today UnderNew Rules, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 1993, atAl; Cindy Skrzycki, Lawmakers
Lean on FCC Over New Cable Rules: Rising Rates Spur Complaint, WASH. POST,
Sept. 25, 1993, at Cl.
But see Paul Farhi, FCC Rules Cut Most Cable TV Bills, WASH. POST, Oct. 13,
1993, at Al; Howard Kurtz, Media Scramble Story of Who Got the Bill for Cable TV
Bill, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 1993, at A9.
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be faulted for believing was at least in remission if not cured.6
Opponents of rate regulation have not been entirely bashful about
capitalizing on the regulators' predicament.7 Indeed, the bemusement in some quarters is akin to the glee of the sophomoric
prankster who unwraps a Baby Ruth candy bar and throws it in
the shallow end of a swimming pool.8 Even false alarms can
cause a lot of thrashing and gnashing. Determining whether a false
alarm has been signaled on the issue of cable prices, or whether
there is a more serious problem requiring further measures to
assure the intended cost savings to consumers, is once again a
priority of the congressional architects of the Act and the FCC. 9
This Article briefly surveys post-enactment developments by
describing the timetable for phasing in rate regulation and
summarizing the preliminary results of the FCC's effort to
implement the Act. The Article also evaluates the prospects for
successful rate regulation by starting at the beginning: analyzing
the statutory rate provisions contained in Section 3 of the Act'0
and the FCC's implementing regulations." In this regard the
Article focuses on (1) the methodology that has been established
to determine whether regulated cable rates are reasonable, (2) the
shared responsibility of the FCC and local franchise authorities for
regulating rates, and (3) the complexity of the FCC's approach to
rate regulation. The Article concludes that the resulting regulatory
framework is workable, albeit imperfect, and can be improved.
Over time, regulations should achieve the statutory objective of
restraining cable prices until the advent of competition.

6. On October 5, 1992, the U.S. Senate voted 74-25 to override the veto. 138
CONG. REC. S16,676 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992). The U.S. House of Representatives voted
308-114 to override the veto. 138 CONG. REc. HI1,487-88 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992).
Previously, in September 1992, the respective votes favoring passage of the 1992 Cable
Act were 280-128 in the House and 74-25 in the Senate. 138 CONG. REC. H8687 (daily
ed. Sept. 17, 1992); 138 CONG. REc. S14,616 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1992).
7. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 5.
8. See CADDYSHACK (Orion Pictures 1980).
9. Oversight Hearing, supra note 4.
10. 47 U.S.C.A. § 543 (West Supp. 1993) (amending 47 U.S.C. § 543 (1988)).
11. Rate Order, supra note 2.
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The market and the public are experiencing an initial, and
understandably confusing, period of adjustment. Short term price
reductions, which had been oversold, are significant but not
dramatic. Soon, regulatory price caps will help to assure that over
the long term rate increases are reasonable. The results of the
effort to regulate cable will largely be determined by the compliance and conduct of the cable industry, which ultimately has the
greatest stake in helping to demonstrate that its pricing practices
are reasonable. Should it be determined that the initial attempt to
moderate cable rates is falling short, turning back the clock to an
era of unbridled monopoly prices is as politically implausible as
it is, in practical terms, unlikely. 2 Accordingly, the Article will
also discuss some of the options that exist for fine tuning rate
regulation, including further rate freezes, adjusting the current rate
12. It is more likely that momentum will continue to build for legislation to permit
telephone company (telco) entry into the subscription television market as a competitive
counterweight to cable. The Communications Competitiveness and Infrastructure
Modernization Act of 1993, H.R. 1504, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), was introduced on
March 29, 1993, by Representatives Rick Boucher (D-Va.) and Michael G. Oxley (ROhio). Representatives James H. Cooper (D-Tenn.) and Ronald L. Wyden (D-Or.), for
example, both announced their decision to co-sponsor H.R. 1504 at the Oversight
Hearing,supra note 4. Both had declined to endorse earlier telco entry bills. Subsequently, Representative Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.), Chairman, House Telecommunications
and Finance Subcommittee, endorsed conditional telco entry. Rep. Edward J. Markey,
Statement Before the United States Telephone Association Annual Convention (Oct. 4,
1993) [hereinafter Markey, USTA Statement] (transcript on file with the Federal
CommunicationsLaw Journal).There are 57 co-sponsors of H.R. 1504. The Telecommunications Infrastructure Act, S. 1086, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), introduced by
Senators John C. Danforth (R-Mo.) and Daniel K. Inouye (D-Haw.), also contains a telco
entry provision. The effort to repeal the restrictions in the 1984 Act precluding telco
entry into subscription television was also propelled by the recent decision in
Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Va.
1993).
However, Representative Joe L. Barton (D-Tex.) has introduced the Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1993, H.R. 3157, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1993), which would repeal all but the retransmission consent section of the
1992 Cable Act. House Judiciary Committee opponents of the retransmission consent
provisions contained in § 6 of the 1992 Cable Act introduced two bills to amend the new
law early in the session. H.R. 12, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), introduced by House
Intellectual Property Subcommittee Chair Representative William J. Hughes (D-N.J.) and
the ranking Subcommittee minority member Representative Carlos J. Moorhead (R-Cal.),
and H.R. 190, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), introduced by Intellectual Property
Subcommittee member Representative Barney Frank (D-Mass.), would repeal the new
retransmission consent provisions outright.
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benchmarks to require lower prices, as well as other steps that
might still be taken if necessary to afford consumers the full
benefits of reasonable prices until the advent of competition in the
multichannel subscription television marketplace.
I. REGULATORY TIMETABLE AND INITIAL RESULTS:
CABLE RATES A YEAR LATER

Phased-In Relief
At this writing, not one of the rate increases sparking the
present controversy has yet been reviewed formally, much less
approved, by either the FCC or a local authority under rate
regulations established by the 1992 Cable Act. In order to evaluate
the impact of the new law, it is essential to understand the
timetable for phased-in rate regulation established both by the Act
and its implementing regulations. When the Act became law on
October 5, 1992, Congress gave the FCC six months to devise a
comprehensive regulatory system for a virtually unregulated
industry by requiring the Commission to issue rules for (1) the
regulation primarily by local authorities of the basic tier of service
and related equipment charges, 3 (2) the regulation of other
"cable programming services"--essentially nonbasic premium tiers
of programming not offered on a per channel or per program' 4
basis-upon complaints by subscribers and local authorities,
and (3) the prevention of cable systems not subject to effective
competition from evading the requirements of the Act. 5 The

A.

13. 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(b)(1)-(3) (West Supp. 1993).
14. 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(c) (West Supp. 1993).
15. Id. The Act contains a "grandfather clause" exempting from the new rate
regulations, rate regulation agreements between a franchise authority and a cable
operator entered into before July 1, 1990, where there was no effective competition
under the rules then in effect. 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(j) (West Supp. 1993). The Act also
requires regulations for the collection of financial information from cable operators one
year after enactment, and annually thereafter, 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(g) (West Supp. 1993),
and for the Commission to annually publish reports on average rates for basic and
premium services and equipment, 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(k) (West Supp. 1993).
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FCC met this deadline by issuing a massive set of regulations on
April 1, 1993.16
The effective date of the FCC's rate regulation was September 1, 1993." This date actually only starts the clock on the steps
eventually leading to regulation of the basic and premium services.
For example, beginning on September 1, local authorities were
able to begin filing with the FCC for the approval required by the
Act for local authorities to regulate basic service.18 Under the
Act, the application for approval is deemed approved unless disapproved by the Commission within thirty days.1 9 However, local
authorities are not able to begin regulating basic rates until they
have adopted regulations consistent with the FCC regulations and
have procedures in place to provide interested parties an opportunity to comment.2" The local authority has 120 days to satisfy
these requirements and then must notify the cable operator in its
jurisdiction before it can begin to regulate rates and, if necessary,
order refunds.2 ' The cable operator, for its part, may seek a stay
of rate regulation either in a petition for reconsideration within
thirty days after the local authority has initially qualified, or at any
16. See Rate Order,supra note 2.
17. The FCC initially announced that its regulations would go into effect on June 21,
1993. Rate Order, supra note 2, para. 484. However, the effective date was moved to
October 1, 1993, because of the Commission's concern that it needed Congress to
provide additional resources to fulfill its responsibilities under the Act. In re Implementation of Sections of the Cable TV Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992,
Rate Reg., Order, 58 Fed. Reg. 33,560, 73 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 14 (1993) [hereinafter
Freeze Order Extension] (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. § 76.1090). When Congress
granted the FCC additional funding on July 6, 1993, the FCC moved up the effective
date of the regulations to September 1, 1993. In re Implementation of Sections of the
Cable TV Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Rate Reg., Erratum, 8
FCC Rcd. 4511, para. 1 (1993).
18. 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(a)(3) (West Supp. 1993). There is no deadline for a local
authority to apply. Rate Order, supra note 2, para. 87. By early November 1993 less
than 5000 out of over 30,000 local franchise authorities had contacted the FCC regarding
certification. Paul Farhi, Few Localities Regulate Cable Rates, WASH. POST, Nov. 11,
1993, at B11; Vincente Pasdeloup, FCCExtends Freeze, CABLE WORLD, Nov. 1, 1993,
at 1, 1.
19. 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(a)(6) (West Supp. 1993); see Rate Order,supra note 2, paras.
85-93 & app. A paras. 22-27 (new petitions for certification after disapproval or
revocation are to be approved or disapproved within 90 days).
20. Rate Order, supra note 2, para. 87.
21. Id.
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time thereafter in a petition for revocation.22 Consequently, many
if not most local authorities will not commence enforcement of the
1992 Cable Act until several months after the September 1, 1993,
effective date of the regulations and perhaps not until 1994.23
The timetable for regulating other nonbasic programming
services-loosely described as premium services-is different. The
Act provides that rate regulation of such nonbasic cable programming services and related equipment charges will only occur in
response to specific complaints filed with the FCC alleging that a
particular operator's rates are unreasonable. The FCC started to
accept such complaints on September 1, 1993. The premium
service regulations apply prospectively to rates paid on or after
this date. 4 The Act also creates a statute of limitations for
complaints about existing rates. Complaints about the rates
charged on September 1, 1993, must be filed within 180 days of
the effective date. With regard to rate increases for premium
services, complaints must be filed "within a reasonable period of
time following a change in rates initiated after the effective
date,' 26 which the FCC has set at forty-five days from the time
subscribers receive a bill that reflects the rate increase. 7
Upon receipt of a complaint, the Commission will review the
complaint to determine whether it meets the minimum showing
needed to permit the complaint to go forward. The operator must
respond to a complaint within thirty days of service of the
complaint, unless the Commission notifies the operator that the

22. Id. paras. 88-90. Such stays will be automatically granted if the petition
challenges the approval on jurisdictional grounds, that is, on grounds that the operator
faces effective competition, and may be granted on other grounds, subject to refund
liability should the petition be denied. Id. paras. 89-90.
23. There have been reports that some cable operators are encouraging local
authorities not to file for certification and that local authorities are intimidated about
having responsibility for rate regulation. Oversight Hearing,supra note 4 (remarks of
Rep. W.J. (Billy) Tauzin (D-La.)); Robichaux, supra note 5, at Al.
24. 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(c)(1)(C) (West Supp. 1993). The Act only authorizes refunds
for premium service overcharges paid after the filing of complaints and, thus, exempts
rates paid prior to September 1, 1993. Id.
25. 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(c)(3) (West Supp. 1993).
26. Id.
27. Rate Order,supra note 2, paras. 336, 338, 356 & app. A paras. 82-85.
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complaint is invalid.28 The Commission can order both prospective rate reductions and refunds of excess charges calculated from
the date the complaint was filed until the date the rate was
reduced to the appropriate level.2 9 In sum, the separate regulations for nonbasic cable services and related equipment charges
will not be, like the regulations for basic services, fully operational
until several months after the September 1, 1993, effective date.
It will be hardly possible to fairly judge their results at least until
1994.
A fair question is to ask why there has been an outcry over
the consequences of the Act if the implementing regulations have
only just begun to take effect. In part, and only in part, the answer
lies in widespread confusion over the nature of actions intended
by the FCC to take account of the long delay before the onset of
rate regulation in order to protect subscribers in the interim.30
The first was a temporary rate freeze ordered by the Commission
that went into effect when it issued its Rate Order in April 1993
and, although initially scheduled to expire six months later in
November, has been extended until February 1994.31

28. Id. paras. 332-333.
29. Id. para. 368 & app. A para. 86.
30. It has also been suggested that changes in the effective date of the regulations,
from June 21, 1993, to October 1, 1993, and then back to September 1, 1993, In re
Implementation of Sections of the Cable TV Consumer Protection and Competition Act
of 1992, Rate Reg., Order, 58 Fed. Reg. 41,042, paras. 1-2, 73 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
16 (1993) [hereinafter OrderofJuly 27], may also have contributed to the confusion and
started the regulatory clock running before the FCC was fully equipped to manage the
regulations. See OversightHearing,supra note 4 (statement of James H. Quello, Acting
Chairman, FCC), (statement of Andrew C. Barrett, Commissioner, FCC).
31. In re Implementation of Sections of the Cable TV Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, Rate Reg., Order, 8 FCC Rcd. 2921 [hereinafter Freeze
Order] (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. § 76.1090), clarifiedby In re Implementation of the
Cable TV Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Order,8 FCC Rcd. 2917,
amended by Cable TV Act, Report and Order and FurtherNotice of ProposedRule
Making, 58 Fed. Reg. 29,736, 29,753 (1993) [hereinafter Amended Freeze Order] (to be
codified at 47 C.F.R. § 76.900). Originally the rate freeze extended to August 3, 1993.
The freeze was extended to November 15, 1993, after the effective date of the
regulations was changed. Freeze OrderExtension, supra note 17, para. 1; OrderofJuly
27, supra note 30, para. 1; see supra note 17 and accompanying text. The FCC has
extended the freeze yet again. Paul Farhi, Few LocalitiesRegulating Cable Rates, supra
note 18; see also Pasdeloup, supra note 18.
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The freeze is actually a "slurpee." Chilled, perhaps, but not
frozen solid, individual rate components of monthly bills are free
to move. Charges for basic service, nonbasic service, and
equipment can change up or down so long as the average
subscriber bill maintains the same level.32 After all, the rate
increases fueling the current debate over the Act all occurred
during the purported rate freeze.33
The freeze order, which in reality is closer to a revenue
freeze than a rate freeze,34 applied to all cable rates not subject
to effective competition other than rates for per channel or payper-view program services and related equipment." During the
freeze, the average monthly subscriber bill for regulated services
and equipment could not increase above the average monthly

32. The Amended Freeze Order provides:
(a) The average monthly subscriber bill for services provided by cable
operators subject to regulation under Section 623 of the Communications Act
shall not increase above the average monthly subscriber bill determined under
rates in effect on April 5, 1993, for a period of 120 days.
(b) The average monthly subscriber bill shall be calculated by determining for
a monthly billing cycle the sum of all billed monthly charges for all cable
services subject to regulation under Section 623 of the Communications Act
and dividing that sum by the number of subscribers receiving any of those
services. The average monthly subscriber bill determined under rates in effect
on April 5, 1993, shall be calculated based on customer charges for the most
recent monthly billing cycle ending prior to April 5, 1993.
Amended Freeze Order, supra note 31, at 29,753.
33. It is not apparent that there is any specific enforcement mechanism for the
freeze, or that any procedures have been formulated to investigate and penalize
companies for failure to comply. At this writing, the FCC has apparently issued Letters
of Inquiry to several cable companies and several state attorneys general are reportedly
investigating cable rate practices under the new Cable Act. See, e.g., Attorneys General
to Probe Cable TV Price Increases, DAILY VARIETY, Nov. 19, 1993, at 22.
34. More precisely, the order freezes revenues per subscriber. If the number of
subscribers increases, or if revenues are calculated on a per channel basis, then total
revenues can increase notwithstanding the freeze order.
35. Freeze Order, supra note 31, paras. 15, 53. The Commission also announced
several other steps designed to protect subscribers in the interim between adoption and
implementation of its regulations, including investigating the rates of systems whose
rates remain well above competitive levels, cost studies of selected cable operators to
test the accuracy of the Commission's formulas, and conducting further surveys of
industry rates to refine its rate formulas as appropriate. Id.; Rate Order on Reconsideration, supra note 2, para. 130; see also Action in Docket Case-CableSystem to Reduce
Rates to "Competitive" Levels (MM Dkt. No. 92-266), FCC News, Apr. 1, 1993, at 1
[hereinafter Action in Docket Case].
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subscriber bill for such services and equipment under rates in
effect on April 5, 1993. The freeze did not preclude operators
from adding subscribers, retiering services, unbundling services
and equipment, or providing additional services and equipment, so
long as the FCC did not find that the cable operator intended to
evade the freeze and the average monthly subscriber bill did not
increase over the April 5, 1993, level. Moreover, cable operators
were able to increase or decrease the charge for a tier or for
equipment related services, again so long as the average monthly
rate did not increase.36
The second source of some confusion has been popularly
heralded and perhaps oversold as a rate "rollback" to levels
existing as of September 30, 1992. Semantical somersaults yes,
rollback no: the so-called rollback is in reality a calculation of
what reasonable rates would have been at the time the Act became
law and then a determination to use this price level in calculating
prospectively, with adjustments for inflation, what reasonable rates
would be once rate regulations began. 37 As far as can be determined, the FCC has not yet rolled back and does not plan simply
to roll back current rates to the pre-enactment levels of September 30, 1992, notwithstanding passages in the Rate Order and the
accompanying press releases to the contrary.38
36. See FCC Fact Sheet, supra note 4 (citing research of Paul Kagan Associates,
Inc., estimating that freeze will save consumers between $122 and $200 million).
37. Some of the credit for this approach must go to the cable industry, which
apparently suggested the adjustments forward for inflation. Letter from James P.
Mooney, President, Nat'l Cable TV Ass'n, to Ervin S. Duggan, Commissioner, FCC
(Mar. 25, 1993). The National Cable Television Association (NCTA) also initially
proposed the benchmark system of rate regulation essentially adopted by the FCC, and
demonstrated to the FCC how to correct errors in its survey data. Comments of the
National Cable TV Ass'n, Inc. on the Commission's Database to the Implementation of
Sections of the Cable TV Consumer Protectionand Competition Act of 1992, Rate Reg.
in MM Dkt. No. 92-266 (Mar. 8, 1993) [hereinafter NCTA Database Comments];
Comments of the National Cable TV Ass'n, Inc. to the Implementation of Sections of the
Cable TV ConsumerProtectionand Competition Act of 1992, Rate Reg. in MM Dkt. No.
92-266 (Jan. 27, 1993) [hereinafter Initial NCTA Database Comments].
38. The Author freely concedes that, notwithstanding considerable effort, his
understanding of the relevant regulatory passages might be flawed. Consider the
following passages of the Rate Order, supra note 2: para. 14 n.29 (rates will be reduced
no more than 10% below a system's rates "as of the date of the survey"); para. 15
("significant reductions from current rate levels'); para. 15 (rates will fall "approximately
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In the NPRM the FCC sought comment on whether the Act
reflects a congressional intent that its regulations yield rates
generally lower than those in effect when the Cable Act was
enacted, or "rather a congressional intent that our rules serve
primarily as a check on prospective rate increases."39 In the Rate
Order the FCC then concluded that the "initial effort to regulate
rates for Cable service should provide for reductions from current
rates of regulated cable systems with rates above competitive
levels. Thus, [the] initial implementation of rate regulation of
cable service will generally lead to significant reductions from
current rate levels for most cable systems."4 The approach
adopted by the Commission to accomplish this goal is complicated.
Before issuing its Rate Order the Commission conducted a
survey of cable system rates as of September 30, 1992. It found
that on average, rates of systems not subject to effective competi-

10 percent from September 30, 1992 levels, unless the operator can justify a higher rate
based on costs"); para. 187 ("By comparing the rate derived by applying the benchmark
formula to a cable system's current or September 30, 1992 rates ... we determine an
initial reasonable regulated rate for each cable system."); paras. 213-217 (discussing
application of the benchmark to determine initial regulated rate levels); and, especially,
para. 216 ("We will not require any reductions for basic tier rates that are at or below
the system's benchmark level at the time the system becomes subject to regulation.') and
para. 216 n.542 ("Our benchmark formula is based on cable system rates in effect on
September 30, 1992. We will therefore compare systems' current rates to the benchmark
rates produced by the formula, adjusted forward by inflation. We find no basisfor
requiringa rollbackfor systems that have raisedratesfrom September 30, 1992 levels
to the extent the increased rates are still below the benchmark on the date regulation
begins.") (emphasis added); para. 218 ("[R]eductions required for systems with basic
rates above the benchmark should be made from the rates in effect on September 30,
1992... . Accordingly, to protect subscribers from potentially unwarranted rate increases
that may have occurred since September 30, 1992, we will set the reasonable rate level
for systems with above-benchmark rates at the September 30, 1992 rates, reduced by 10
percent or to the benchmark, whichever yields the higher rate level.'); para. 396 & n.969
(the method for determining regulated rates for premium will be the same as for basic).
See also id. app. D, Form 393 and accompanying worksheets. It should be noted that
whether or not any "rollback" occurs, and the size of any rollback reduction, is affected
(and further complicated) by the formula adopted by the Commission, and discussed
more fully below, which compares current rates per channel including rates reduced by
equipment cost reductions to per channel benchmarks.
39. Rate Order, supra note 2, para. 12 (emphasis added).
40. Id. para. 15 (emphasis added).
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tion are approximately 10 percent higher than rates of comparable
systems subject to effective competition, as that term is defined by
the Act.4 ' The FCC neither ordered a rollback of cable prices to
1992 levels, nor did it order an immediate 10 percent cut. Nor did
the FCC order rates to fall back to benchmarks it found represented competitive rates. Instead, its approach was to enable, once
rate regulation became effective,
local franchise authorities to require rates for the basic tier, and the
Commission to require rates for cable programming services on the
basis of individual complaints, to fall approximately 10 percent,
unless the operator is already charging rates that are at the "competitive" benchmark level or it can justify a higher rate from September 30, 1992 levels, based on costs. 42

The rate formula determines, in individual cases, the initial
permitted level of rates once a cable operator becomes subject to
rate regulation. 3 After September 1, 1993, when a cable operator
is charging rates that are below the adjusted 1992 benchmark for
that system, the initial permitted regulated rate for that system is
the rate in effect on the date the system becomes subject to
regulation, regardless of the amount that the rate is below the
competitive benchmark.' After September 1, 1993, rates exceeding the applicable adjusted benchmark are deemed presumptively
unreasonable. 45 The average rate for such systems can be reduced
up to 10 percent, but no lower than the adjusted benchmark.46
The FCC also expressly declined to require all systems to
"now reduce rates to benchmark levels"-that is, to rollback the
rates.47 Indeed, systems were left free to further adjust their rates
to reflect inflation occurring since September 1992 and to make
further adjustments if the number of subscribers or channels on the

41. Id. app. A para. 6.
42. Id. app. A para. 7.
43. For discussion of this see id. app. A paras. 49-53.
44. Id. app. A para. 49. This rule seemed to create an incentive for cable systems
with the lowest rates to raise their rates prior to the effective date of regulation.
45. Id. app. A para. 50.
46. Id. app. A para. 51.
47. Id. app. A para. 52.
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system changed between September 1992 and the time of
regulation.48
B.

Initial Results
The FCC has predicted that overall rates would be reduced
for between two-thirds and three-quarters of American households
receiving cable television.49 In September 1993 it ordered an
expedited survey of the twenty-five largest cable multisystem
operators to determine whether this forecast was likely to be
correct.50 Legislators and regulators have generally agreed that no
regulatory modification should be made at least until the FCC has
this data in hand. 1
The results of the FCC's survey of the twenty-five largest
cable MSOs are mixed and inconclusive. 2 The survey directed
each of these MSOs to report on rates from the ten largest systems
within the MSO that are expected to be subject to rate regulation.53 The FCC survey sought to compare the average per
subscriber revenues in effect in September 1993. Operators were
also required to provide rate cards and channel line-ups for these
two time periods. This information was used to confirm and, "in

48. Id. app. A para. 53. Instead, the Commission announced the following steps: (1)
further surveys to refine the competitive benchmark and the rate differentials between
competitive systems and systems not subject to effective competition; (2) issuing a
FurtherNotice or adjusting the competitive benchmark calculation; and (3) investigating
rates of cable systems with rates far above the benchmarks even after the 10%
reductions. Id. app. A para. 52.
49. Id. para. 15; see also Action in Docket Case, supra note 35; FCC Fact Sheet,
supra note 4, at 1.
50. In re Implementation of Sections of the Cable TV Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, Rate Reg., Order in Dkt. No. 92-266, FCC 93-446 (Sept. 17,
1993).
51. Oversight Hearing,supra note 4.
52. At the FCC open meeting of October 21, 1993, the FCC announced preliminary
results of its survey but declined to release the data until it had an opportunity to analyze
the findings further and prepare a more extensive report. Action in Docket Case-FCC
Announces Preliminary Results of Cable Rate Survey (MM Dkt. No. 92-266), FCC
News, Oct. 21, 1993.
53. Id. at 1. The survey thus left considerable discretion to the MSOs in determining
reportable rates. Moreover, the scope of the survey, while covering large numbers of
subscribers, only reflected rates in large systems.
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a number of cases, correct the data" submitted by the cable
4
MSOs.

5

The FCC found that eleven of the twenty-five surveyed
MSOs have restructured services in anticipation of rate regulation
to offer purportedly unregulated packages of per channel ("a la
carte") offerings. Accordingly, pending further analysis of the data
from the eleven MSOs that introduced a la carte packages, the
FCC initially released results only on the fourteen reporting MSOs
that did not choose to offer extensive new a la carte services.5 5
Analysis of the survey results for the eleven MSOs that introduced
a la carte packages will be included in a final report to be released
in November 1993.
With respect to the fourteen MSOs that did not introduce a
la carte offerings, the FCC reported that approximately 68 percent
of subscribers to systems owned by these operators experienced
rate reductions for their regulated services (including equipment).5 ' The average bill for regulated services declined approximately 8 percent while subscribers received, on average, approximately 6 percent more channels.57 The FCC found that the
average bill for regulated services offered by these fourteen MSOs
declined by about two dollars, and the number of regulated
channels received by subscribers increased by more than two
channels. 8 The preliminary survey findings also show that
equipment charges for subscribers have declined significantly. The
monthly charges for remote controls dropped nearly 90 percent, on
average, and additional outlet charges dropped approximately 95
percent, on average. 9 However, according to the FCC's calcula-

54. Id.
55. Id. Apparently, the FCC did not attempt to ask the question: What would a
subscriber pay now in order to obtain the same programming the subscriber received in
April? The FCC is now attempting to reconstruct the data to answer this question.
56. Id. at 2.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. Apparently, the survey did not examine whether cable systems are offsetting
equipment price reductions by new charges for services and features previously not
charged to subscribers.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 46

tions, about one-third (or approximately 31 percent) of subscribers
to these systems experienced an overall rate increase.6"
The 25 MSOs surveyed provide service to approximately 75
percent of the country's 58 million cable subscribers. The 245
systems for which operators reported data provide cable service to
approximately 14 million, or roughly one-quarter, of all subscribers.
The fourteen MSOs for which preliminary results are being reported
[by the FCC] today serve 23.9 million cable subscribers, and the
data they provided covers roughly 8 million of the 14 million
subscribers encompassed by the survey.6'

These results are only partially satisfying to the FCC and
have prompted the Chairman of the House telecommunications
subcommittee to ask for the General Accounting Office (GAO) to
conduct an independent survey.62 While the results provide the
FCC and the regulated industry with some basis for arguing that
the rate regulation is working and that no drastic overhaul is
necessary, several serious concerns remain to be addressed.
First, it will be necessary to examine and determine how it
can possibly be consistent with the intent of the Act for at least a
third of subscribers surveyed to experience rate increases. Second,

60. Id.

61. Id. at 2. The NCTA performed its own analysis of the data, which was used to
brief FCC staff, members of Congress, and the press, but has not been released formally
to the public. In general, the NCTA reportedly found that the FCC met its goal of
reducing regulated cable rates for three-quarters of subscribers by 10%.
62. See Edmund L. Andrews, Cable Rates Have Risenfor Many, F.C.C. Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 22, 1993, at D2; Paul Farhi, FCC Hedges in Saying Cable Rates Fell,
WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 1993, at B1. There have been indications since that the GAO will

work with FCC staff and analyze FCC data as well as assist with the preparation of the
first annual report required by the Act rather than prepare an independent study. In a
subsequent letter, Chairman Markey called for a further investigation of cable rates
noting reports of certain evasive practices. Letter from Representative Edward J. Markey,
Chairman, House Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance, to James H. Quello,
Acting Chairman, FCC (Oct. 26, 1993) (on file with the Federal Communications Law
Journal). In the October 26 letter to Quello, Markey said: "We must not leave the
American cable consumer at the mercy of arbitrary and unreasonable rate practices by
cable operators." Markey provided several examples of types of practices that he said
appeared to be violations of the law, including: (1) basic service in one Florida system
jumped about 50%, to $21.05 monthly; (2) bill in Indiana for basic service climbed 48%,
to $20.64; (3) California system is moving channels to a la carte status to avoid
regulation with seven channels that had been part of basic package now offered
separately; and (4) system in Maryland claiming Cable Act did not allow it to offer
discounts to senior citizens, when in fact Act specifically does so. Id.
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the reported results indicating average rate reductions for a large
majority of subscribers will bear closer scrutiny to determine
whether the savings are genuine and consistent with the Act, or
rather a somewhat illusory consequence of the FCC's methodology. One of the questions that should be examined is simply:
Are you better off today than you were before regulation? In other
words, the FCC should attempt to determine what the charge was
for a certain package of programming before April 1993 and then
determine what it would cost a consumer to obtain the same
programming today. The FCC should also attempt to inquire about
new billing practices that may add charges to subscriber bills that
offset or surpass rate reduction. In addition, the FCC should
monitor what subscribers are being told by cable companies in
order to explain and justify changes in billing practices. Obtaining
that information would provide the FCC with some basis for
correcting the confusion that now exists in the marketplace. In the
meantime, based on the facts now available, it is not possible to
conclude definitively whether or not the regulations are in all
significant respects upholding the 1992 Act.
II.

CONGRESSIONAL MANDATE

Above all else, Congress passed the 1992 Cable Act to
respond to genuine grass-roots concerns about rising cable
television prices compiled in a massive legislative record over
several years.63 While various statutory provisions in this com-

63. The relevant committee reports include: H.R. CONF. REP. No. 862, 102d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1992), reprintedin 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1231; H.R. REP. No. 628, 102d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1992); S. REP. No. 92, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), reprintedin 1992 U.S.C.
C.A.N. 1133. The House bill, H.R. 4850, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), did not contain
a retransmission consent provision, and the conference agreement adopted the Senate
retransmission consent language. Therefore, Senate Report 92 is especially important on
this issue.
The legislative history of the Act also includes the floor debate accompanying the
veto override votes. 138 CONG. REc. S16,676 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992); 138 CONG. REC.
H8687 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1992). See also 138 CONG. REc. S16,652-77 and Hi 1,477-88
(daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992); the presidential veto message, Message to the Senate Returning
Without Approval the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
1992, 28 WEEKLY COMP. OF PREs. Doc. 1860 (Oct. 3, 1992); the floor debates
accompanying consideration and passage of Conference Report 862 in the Senate, 138
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plex Act may be subject to differing interpretations, the intent of
64
Congress to protect consumers from monopoly prices is clear.
Viewed in the context of the whole Act, the approach Congress
took demonstrates a strong preference for competition and a
reluctance to dictate prices. 65 Recognizing that competition would
only develop over time, Congress authorized an interim system of
rate regulation for the basic tier of programming and for other
cable programming approximating what might result from a
competitive market.
A.

Background
When Congress enacted the 1992 Cable Act, it repealed the
deregulatory provisions of the Cable Communications Policy Act
of 198466 (1984 Cable Act or 1984 Act) and directed the FCC to
reinvent rate regulation. The 1984 Cable Act embodied the first
comprehensive federal policy for cable television. Prior to its
enactment, cable television was regulated principally at the local
level through the franchise process. The 1984 Act prohibited local
authorities from regulating the basic service rates of cable systems
that faced "effective competition," as defined by the FCC. 67 After

CONG. REC. S14,222-51 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1992) and in the House, 138 CONG. REC.
H8671-87 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1992); and the floor debates accompanying consideration
and passage of the House bill, H.R. 4850, 138 CONG. REC. H6531-44 (daily ed. July 23,
1992), as well as the Senate bill, S. 12, 138 CONG. REC. S400-33 (daily ed. Jan. 27,
1992), 138 CONG. REC. S561-611 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1992), 138 CONG. REC. S635-97
(daily ed. Jan. 30, 1992).
The full extent of the legislative history, including related legislative materials and
events over several years, is discussed in Nicholas W. Allard, The 1992 Cable Act: Just
the Beginning, 15 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 305, 307-11 (1993).
64. For example, prior to consideration of Conference Report 862 in the Senate, the
Floor Manager of the bill, Communications Subcommittee Chairman Daniel K. Inouye
explained that the "driving force" behind the legislation was excessive consumer rates
and rejected cable industry arguments that consumer rates would rise because of the
retransmission consent provisions in the bill. 138 CONG. REC. S14,223-24 (daily ed.
Sept. 21, 1992) (statement of Sen. Inouye (D-Haw.)).
65. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(c) (West Supp. 1993).
66. Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
67. 47 U.S.C. § 543(b) (1988). A cable system was considered to be subject to
effective competition if the entire community it served could receive three or more
unduplicated broadcast signals. S. REP. No. 92, supra note 63, at 4, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 1136; H.R. REP. No. 628, supra note 63, at 30-31; see ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554
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deregulation took effect on December 29, 1986, over 97 percent
of all cable systems across the country were free from any form
of government rate regulation.68 The objective of deregulation
was to "enable the cable industry to prosper, benefiting both
consumers and industry participants alike.169 A balance was
sought between relying on the local franchising process as the
primary means of regulation and encouraging the growth of a new
industry by leaving it relatively free to set its own rates. Congress
expected that the availability of competing programming services
would keep rates at reasonable levels and that local franchise
authorities would ensure that cable authorities responded to the
needs of the community.7"
The 1984 Cable Act achieved many of its objectives. Since
that time cable television has grown rapidly and provided
consumers a wide array of extremely popular, diverse, and often
innovative programming. Cable penetration of 37 percent of
households in 1985 grew to 61 percent in 1992. 71 Monthly
revenue earned by cable operators grew from $18.94 per subscrib-

(D.C. Cir. 1987) (upholding FCC standard), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988).
68. S.REP. No. 92, supra note 63, at4, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1136; H.R. REP. No.
628, supra note 63, at 30-31. The FCC eventually revised its definition of "effective
competition" to be either (1) six unduplicated over-the-air broadcast signals, or (2)
competing multichannel video provider available to 50% of the homes passed by the
existing cable system and subscribed to by at least 10% of the homes passed. In re
Reexamination of the Effective Competition Std. for the Reg. of Cable TV Basic Serv.
Rates, Report and Order and Second FurtherNotice of Proposed Rulemaking, 6 FCC
Red.4545 (1991); see S. REP. No. 92, supra note 63, at 8, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1140.
According to the GAO, however, the rates of only 20% of the nation's cable subscribers
would be regulated under the new definition. H.R. REP. No. 628, supra note 63, at 3334; see generally GAO Cable Rate Survey: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Telecommunications andFinance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 40-107 (1989) [hereinafter GAO Cable Rate Survey]; U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TELECOMMUNICATIONS: FOLLOW-UP NATIONAL SURVEY OF CABLE
TELEVISION RATES AND SERVICES (June 13, 1990) [hereinafter GAO FOLLOW-UP
SURVEY]; U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TELECOMMUNICATIONS: 1991 SURVEY
OF CABLE RATES AND PRICES (July 17, 1991) [hereinafter 1991 GAO RATE SURVEY].

Consumer groups and cable competitors continued to complain that the FCC's new
standard did not obviate the need for a legislative approach to protect consumers,
because cable systems continued to enjoy a constructive monopoly in most local markets.
69. H.R. REP. No. 628, supra note 63, at 29.
70. Id. at 30.
71. Id. at 29.
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er in 1984 to $28.02 in 1992.72 Total industry gross revenues
(subscriber services plus advertising) grew from $8.3 billion in
1984 to over $24 billion in 1992, 73 while total advertising
revenues increased almost six-fold from less than $600 million in
1984 to approximately $3.4 billion in 1992.74
While the cable industry thrived in this era, rapid expansion
into a regulatory void was not checked by any significant
competition from comparable providers of multichannel subscription television. The competition Congress anticipated during
consideration of the 1984 Act, from wireless cable and private
cable operators, from the home satellite dish market and direct
broadcast satellite, and from cable overbuilders, simply failed to
materialize as an adequate counterweight. Cable's competitors now
serve, in the aggregate, fewer than 6 percent of American
households."
B.

Deregulated Cable Rates-1986-92
In the absence of either local rate regulation or meaningful
competition, municipalities, consumer groups, and subscribers
urged Congress with increasing intensity to do something about
unreasonable price increases in the cost of cable service.
The Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance, Representative Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.),
initiated a series of GAO surveys of cable rates released in
1989,76 1990, 77 and 1991.78 Overall, the GAO found that dur-

72. Paul Kagan Associates, Inc., Cable TV Investor, Feb. 12, 1993, at 5.
73. See NCTA, Cable Television Developments, at 8-A, 9-A (June 1993) (citing Paul
Kagan Associates, Inc., Cable TV Investor and Cable TV Advertising statistics).
74. Id.
75. See Paul Kagan Associates, Inc., Kagan Media Index, Mar. 30, 1993, at 10.
76. GAO Cable Rate Survey, supra note 68. The GAO surveyed 1950 of the then
existing 8908 cable systems. Id. at 47. From 1451 usable responses, it concluded that
monthly rates for the lowest-priced basic service increased by 29%. Id. at 43. This
increase is four times the then prevailing rate of inflation. H.R. REP. No. 628, supra note
63, at 31. The rate increase was accompanied by an increase in the average number of
base channels offered-from nearly 24 to about 30. Rates for "the most popular cable
service" increased by 26%. For this level of service the number of channels increased
from 27 to approximately 32. GAO Cable Rate Survey, supra note 68, at 43. Average
monthly rates for movie channels decreased. Id. at 45.
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ing the first four years of deregulation (November 1986 to April
1991), the monthly charge for the lowest-priced service increased
by 56 percent and for the most popular basic service by 61
percent-amounting to increases of more than three times the rate
of inflation.7 9 In a 1990 report to Congress, the FCC, like the
GAO, also concluded that cable rates rose appreciably.8" The
FCC found that between 1986 and 1989, monthly rates for the
lowest-priced tier of service increased by 36 percent and for the
most popular tier of service by 38 percent.81

77. GAO FOLLOW-UP SURVEY, supra note 68. In this follow-up survey, the GAO
sampled 1971 cable systems and received 1530 usable responses. Id. at 16. The survey
was designed with input from the FCC, the NCTA, the National League of Cities, the
Community Cable Television Association (small and independent cable operators), the
U.S. Conference of Mayors, and congressional staff. Id. at 15. The GAO found that basic
rates continued to increase at "a rather significant rate." H.R. REP. No. 628, supra note
63, at 32. The GAO concluded that the rates for both the lowest-priced and most popular
basic services increased by an average of 10% in 1989 alone. GAO FOLLOW-UP SURVEY,
supra note 68, at 3. This rate was more than double the rate of inflation. H.R. REP. No.
628, supra note 63, at 32.
78. 1991 GAO RATE SURVEY, supra note 68. The third GAO survey examined rates
from December 1989 to April 1991. Id. at 2. Approximately 70% of subscribers for the
most popular service and 66% for the lowest-priced service received rate increases of
more than 10%. Id. at 5. Average monthly rates during this period for the lowest-priced
basic service increased by 9% while the average number of channels offered decreased
by one. Average monthly rates for the most popular service increased by 15%, while the
average number of channels available increased by two. Id. at 2.
79. H.R. REP. No. 628, supra note 63, at 33.
80. In re Competition, Rate Deregulation and the Commission's Policies Relating
to the Provision of Cable TV Serv., Report, 5 FCC Rcd. 4962, para. 19 (1990)
[hereinafter 1990 Report]. The FCC analyzed, among other things, GAO raw data
collected in the GAO 1990 follow-up survey. Id. para. 5 & n.16. Corroborating these
results is the FCC survey conducted after the 1992 Cable Act, finding monopoly rates
ranging from 10 to 28% higher than competitive rates. Rate Order, supra note 2, app.
E paras. 30-31. A recently released study by the Aerie Group, a private consultant to
state and local authorities, sharply criticized the FCC's methodology but concluded that
the differential was also in this range-22%. AERiE GROUP, INC., REALIZING
CONGRESS'S PROMISE OF EFFECTIVE RATE REGULATION FOR CABLE TV CONSUMERS
2, 5 (Sept. 28, 1993). An analysis of the FCC data by Thomas W. Hazlett found that the
cable systems that faced competition from other multichannel distributors charged from
32 to 37% less than monopoly systems. In re Implementation of Sections of the Cable
TV and Consumer Protection Act of 1992, Rate Reg., Affidavit of Thomas W. Hazlett
in MM Dkt. No. 92-266, paras. 11, 13 & n.4 (June 17, 1993) [hereinafter Hazlett
Affidavit] (accompanying Joint Comments of Bell Atlantic, GTE, and the NYNEX Tel.
Cos.).
81. 1990 Report, supra note 80, para. 21.
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While these studies were not definitive, they nevertheless
were found to provide substantial evidence of rate increases at
unacceptable levels.8 2 The House Energy and Commerce Committee concluded:
[R]ate increases imposed by some cable operators are not justified
economically and ...a minority of cable operators have abused
their deregulated status and their market power and have unreasonably raised the rates they charge subscribers. The Committee
believes that it is necessary to protect consumers from unreasonable
cable rates. 3

Similarly, according to the Senate Commerce Committee, the
record of historical and projected rate increases provided "significant and legitimate reasons to be greatly concerned that subscribers, in a deregulated marketplace, are at the mercy of cable
operators' market power." 4
The legislative record contains other significant evidence
bolstering the conclusions that congressional action was warranted.
First, legislators received numerous complaints about particular
rate increases that eclipsed, by far, the average increases reported
by the GAO and the FCC surveys." Several other sources
indicated that cable prices are generally about 20 to 30 percent
cheaper in the few communities where a cable system faces headto-head competition than they are where cable systems face no

82. The GAO reports were criticized by some as representative of only a small
portion of the cable industry and for understating the rate increases because the survey
was voluntary and cable systems with the largest increases might not have responded.
The cable industry argued that the surveys overstated increases by failing to account for
rate changes resulting from "catching-up" after the 1984 Act lifted rate freezes that had
been imposed by local franchising authorities. The merits and pitfalls of the data were
thoroughly discussed and considered by Congress. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 92, supra note
63, at 5-6, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1137.
83. H.R. REP.No. 628, supra note 63, at 33.
84. S. RaP. No. 92, supra note 63, at 8, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1140.
85. See, e.g., S.REP. No. 92, supra note 63, at 5-6, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1138
(remarks of Sen. Wendell Ford (D-Ky.)) (referring to rate increases running as high as
94 to 204%, he states: "[Y]ou come in here and tell us that it's an average of 20 percent
or 26 percent. Why it's just not here when you get right down to it in my particular
State."); see also 135 CONG. REc. 4040 (1989) (statement of Rep. Charles E. Schumer
(D-N.Y.)) (citing a list of 51 cities where cable rates increased 50 or more percent in
1987).
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competition.16 Additionally, the Department of Justice calculated
that at least 45 to 50 percent of the price increases since deregulation were due to market power rather than to increases in
programming costs. 87 Finally, there was strong evidence that the

price trend would continue to turn up sharply, spurred relentlessly
by the imperative of enormous debt service obligations borne by
cable operators.88 In the 1980s cable systems sold for rapidly
increasing amounts-over $3000 per subscriber in many instances-in transactions typically involving very large ratios of
debt to equity.8 9 The future cash flow necessary to service the
debt indicated to legislators that basic rates might well, if left unchecked, double to over $50 per subscriber, by the end of the

86. A study in Consumers' Research of 52 separate markets in 1990 found that in
areas where one cable company existed, fewer channels were offered and the cost per
channel was 33% higher than in areas with competition. John W. Merline et al., How
to Get Better Cable TV at Lower Prices, CONSUMERS' RES., May 1990, at 10, 10. The
Wireless Cable Association (WCA) reported that where microwave competition existed,
cable rates were an average of 25 to 30% lower for subscribers than before competition
existed. Oversight Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of Rep. Edward J. Markey (DMass.)); see Cable Television Regulation (Pt.1): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Telecommunicationsand Financeof the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 538-41 (1990) (statement of Matthew Oristano, Chairman, People's
Choice TV Partners); id. at 542-60 (statement of Joseph W. Hipple III, Chairman,
Venturers Committee, Pacific West Cable); see also Cable TV ConsumerProtectionAct
of 1991: Hearing on S. 12 Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,102d Cong., 1st Sess. 280-81 (1991)
[hereinafter Senate Hearing on S. 12] (statement of Robert L. Schmidt, Pres., WCA)
(discussing other impacts of competition); Cable Television Regulation: Hearings on
H1303 and H2546 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 289 (1991) (statement
of Robert Bilodeau, Director, WCA).
The FCC Regulatory Report projected prices falling 20% from monopoly to
competitive levels. These various reports have generally been supported by postenactment studies. See Rate Order, supra note 2, app. E para. 31; see also AERIE
GROUP, supra note 80 (finding a 22% differential).
87. 138 CONG. REc. S413, S425 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1992) (statements of Sen. John
C. Danforth (R-Mo.) and Sen. Albert Gore (D-Tenn.)) (referring to Department of Justice
study: Market Power and PriceIncreasesfor Basic Cable Services Since Deregulation
(Aug. 1991)).
88. S. REP. No. 92, supra note 63, at 7-8, 10, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1139-40, 1142
(chart on per subscriber values for cable systems).
89. Id. at 7, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1139.
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1990s. 90 This then was the case for finding ways to promote
competition and, if necessary, to reregulate cable television rates.
C.

Congress Acts
The complexity of the rate regulation provisions of the 1992
Act reflects not so much political compromise as it demonstrates
an attempt to accomplish a great deal: to preserve the accomplishments of cable television, which delivers diverse programming to
over 56 million subscribers; to rely on the marketplace to the

extent possible to regulate already competitive markets; and to
secure reasonable rates that are fair to consumers without
destroying the vitality of the cable industry.9 The congressional
preference for competition is stated at the outset of the rate
regulation provisions: "If the Commission finds that a cable
system is subject to effective competition, the rates for the
provision of cable service for such system shall not be subject to
regulation by the Commission or by a State or franchising
authority ....-92

90. Id.Opponents of the Act argued and Congress presumably considered that
regulations requiring rate cuts could curtail the ability of some cable companies to
service their debt. Operators are able under the present regulations to attempt to justify
higher rates needed to service debt in cost-of-service proceedings. In the future, the
allowance for debt service will likely prove to be one of the most important and hotly
contested aspects of the cable rate cost of service proceedings. It is a subject that, in
itself, merits close study.
91. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 543 (West Supp. 1993); see also 1992 Cable Act, Pub. L. No.
102-385, § 2(b), 106 Stat. 1460, 1463 (the statutory policy statements). It is possible to
find better drafted statutes than the rate regulation provisions of the Act. Unlike the
access to programming provisions designed to stimulate competition contained in §§ 12
and 19 of the Act,which were largely derived from the House bill, H.R. CONF. No. 862,
supra note 63, at 82-83, 93, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1264-65, 1275, and language
originally offered by Representative W.J. (Billy) Tauzin (D-La.), id. at 93, 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1275, or the retransmission consent language that was adopted in
Conference from the Senate bill, id. at 76-77, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1258-59, the rate
regulation language of the 1992 Cable Act was both an amalgam and, in important
respects, a significant revision of the relevant portions of both the Senate bill and the
House bill. The resulting text, drafted at the staff level during Conference was first
scrutinized and debated upon floor consideration of the Report of the Conference
Committee.
92. 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(a)(2) (West Supp. 1993).
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D.

Basic Service and Related Equipment Rates
Under the Act, basic service consists of a separately available
service tier that subscribers must purchase to have access to any
other tier of service.93 At a minimum, this basic tier, usually the
least expensive tier of service, must include (1) "must carry"
channels, the signals of local broadcast stations, whose carriage is
now required by law; (2) public, educational, and government
access channels-the so-called "PEG" channels; and (3) any other
broadcast television signal distributed by the cable operator except
for "superstations" such as WTBS, WGN, WPIX, and WORdistant broadcast signals retransmitted by a satellite carrier and
carried by the cable operator.94 A cable operator may add
additional programming to the basic service tier; however, such
additional programming will be subject to the regulations applicable to basic service.95 To prevent retiering schemes designed
to evade the regulations applicable to basic service, cable operators
are not permitted to require subscription to any other tier of
programming as a condition of access to premium programming
sold on a per channel or per program basis.96
The Act establishes the primary, overriding responsibility of
the FCC to assure that subscriber rates for basic service are
reasonable:
COMMISSION OBLIGATION TO SUBSCRIBERS.-The
Commission shall, by regulation, ensure that the rates for the basic
service tier are reasonable. Such regulations shall be designed to
achieve the goal of protecting subscribers of any cable system that
is not subject to effective competition from rates for the basic
service tier that exceed the rates that would be charged for the basic

93. 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(b)(7)(A) (West Supp. 1993).
94. See id.
95. 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(b)(7)(B) (West Supp. 1993).
96. 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(8)(A) (West Supp. 1993). This buy-through prohibition does
not apply to cable systems that lack the technology to sell premium channels in this
manner. 47 U.S.C.A. § 543 (b)(8)(B) (West Supp. 1993). The Act also establishes
regulations pertaining to many other aspects of cable service such as the geographic
structure of rates and rate discrimination within a franchise area, prohibitions against
negative option billing, and the collection of information about rates and billing. 47
U.S.C.A. § 543(d)-(g) (West Supp. 1993).
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service tier if such cable system were subject to effective competition.97

Pursuant to the regulations that the FCC was required to
promulgate in order to meet this obligation, basic service rates are
to be determined in the first instance by qualified local franchising
authorities.98 Local authorities wishing to regulate basic service
and equipment rates must certify in writing to the Commission
that (1) it will adopt rules consistent with the FCC's rate regulations; (2) it has the legal authority and the personnel necessary to
regulate rates; and (3) its procedures provide interested parties
reasonable opportunity to participate in rate regulation.99 Once
filed, the certification becomes automatically effective thirty days
after filing unless the FCC finds, after notice and reasonable
opportunity to comment, that the franchising authority has not met
one of the three criteria. 10 0
If the Commission disapproves or revokes a certification, it
must step into the shoes of the local franchising authority and
exercise regulatory jurisdiction until the unsuccessful applicant for
certification becomes qualified.' ' In contrast to such situations
involving disapproved or revoked certifications for which the FCC
lacks discretion and must directly regulate basic rates, the FCC
presumably has the discretionary authority to determine whether
or not other circumstances warrant FCC direct regulation. The
1992 Cable Act grants the FCC this discretion in order for the
Commission to uphold its statutory obligation to "ensure that rates
for the basic service tier are reasonable" and "to achieve the goal
of protecting subscribers of any cable system that is not subject to

97. 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(b)(1) (West Supp. 1993). This language was formulated in
Conference. Working from the House bill's language and format, Conference Report 862
adopts the Senate bill's basic rate regulation standard (i.e., that the FCC ensure that rates
are reasonable) and establishes a new standard for defining what is reasonable (i.e.,
regulated basic rates should not exceed competitive market prices). H.R. CONF.No. 862,
supra note 63, at 62, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1244.
98. 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(a)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1993).
99. 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(a)(3)(A)-(C) (West Supp. 1993).
100. 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(a)(4) (West Supp. 1993).
101. 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(a)(6) (West Supp. 1993). The FCC must act on refilings for
certification within 90 days of filing of the resubmission. Id.
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effective competition from rates for basic service ... ."'02 This
broad authority, for example, would enable the FCC to regulate
rates in appropriate circumstances even where franchising
authorities had not first sought certification from the Commis103
sion.
The Act provides the FCC considerable latitude in fashioning
the regulations for basic service. Again, the FCC is generally
directed to protect subscribers from paying more for basic service
than they would if their local cable system were subject to
effective competition 4 To meet this obligation, the Act requires the FCC, first, to strive to "reduce the administrative
burdens on subscribers, cable operators, franchising authorities,
and the Commission." 10 5 Second, the FCC may adopt formulas
or other mechanisms and procedures in order to comply with the
directive to reduce administrative burdens." 6 Finally, the FCC's
rate regulations must take into account several factors for gauging
the reasonableness of rates, but the comparative weight, if any,
and the method for balancing these factors are not specified on the
face of the statute. ' 7 These factors include (1) the rates for cable
systems, if any, that are subject to effective competition; ' - (2)
certain specified cost factors; 09 (3) advertising revenues derived
from basic service;.. and (4) a reasonable profit."'
102. 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(b)(1) (West Supp. 1993) (emphasis added).
103. See NPRM, supra note 2, paras. 51-56; see also Amended Freeze Order,supra
note 31, at 29,754-55.
104. 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(b)(1) (West Supp. 1993).
105. 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(b)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1993).

106. 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(b)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1993).
107. 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(b)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1993). The conferees adopted and
tightened the factors the House bill had required the FCC to take into account to ensure
reasonable basic rates, including limitations on costs that may be allocated and recovered
in the rates charged for basic service. H.R.CONF. No. 862, supra note 63, at 62, 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1244. Conference Report 862 further limits the portion of franchise fees,
taxes, and other charges imposed by state and local authorities on cable operators and
other costs that may be recovered through basic rates. Id. at 63, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
1245. Conference Report 862 also modifies the House bill's "reasonable profit provision
allowing the FCC to consider the profit on nonbasic services when determining a
reasonable profit for basic service. Id.

108. 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(b)(2)(C)(i) (West Supp. 1993).
109. 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(b)(2)(C)(ii), (iii), (v), (vi) (West Supp. 1993).
110. 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(b)(2)(C)(iv) (West Supp. 1993).
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The statute establishes a separate and much more straightforward standard for regulating equipment charges relating to basic
service. It directs the Commission to establish standards for
setting, on the basis of actual cost, the rates for installation and
lease of equipment used by subscribers to receive the basic service
tier, and installation and lease of monthly connections for
additional television receivers.112 The costs of converter boxes,
remote control units, and cable home wiring are included in the
3
actual cost calculations.'
Finally, the statute directs the FCC to establish standards,
guidelines, and procedures for implementing and enforcing the
basic service rate regulations." 4 Other than exhorting the FCC
to assure expeditious dispute resolution, to prevent unreasonable
charges for changes in a subscriber's selection of services or
equipment, and to provide notice to subscribers about the
availability of basic service, the FCC is granted virtually unbridled
15
discretion to design a regulatory procedural regime.'
E.

Nonbasic Service and Related Equipment Rates
Rates for other enhanced or nonbasic cable programming
services are subject to regulation by the FCC, not by local
authorities if, upon complaint, the Commission determines that
such rates are unreasonable. 16 Such cable programming services
are defined broadly to include "any video programming provided
over a cable system, regardless of service tier, including installation or rental of equipment used for the receipt of such video
programming" other than basic service or programming offered on
a per channel or per program basis. 7 Thus, the Act does not

111. 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(b)(2)(C)(vii) (West Supp. 1993).
112. 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(b)(3) (West Supp. 1993).
113. Id.
114. 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(b)(5) (West Supp. 1993).
115. See id.
116. 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(c) (West Supp. 1993). The conferees worked from the House
bill to draft the statutory provisions applicable to premium service and related equipment
charges. H.R. CoNF. No. 862, supra note 63, at 64, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1246.
117. 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(/)(2) (West Supp. 1993). This definition effectively exempts
pay channels and single premium channels from any rate regulation.
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regulate pay channels for which there is a specific per channel or
per program charge." 8
The Act requires the FCC to establish criteria for identifying,
1 19
in individual cases, unreasonable rates for nonbasic services.
In establishing such criteria the FCC must consider the following
factors: (1) rates for similarly situated systems taking into account
similarities in costs and other relevant factors; (2) rates of systems
subject to effective competition; (3) the history of rates for the
system including their relationship to changes in general consumer
prices; (4) the system's rates as a whole for all cable programming, cable equipment, and cable services provided by the system,
other than programming provided on a per channel or per program
basis; (5) capital and operating costs of the system; and (6)
advertising revenues."' The Act permits the FCC to consider
other relevant factors for determining what constitutes reasonable
rates for nonbasic services.12 1 The FCC has flexibility in establishing criteria for reasonable nonbasic service rates because the
Act neither specifies a particular way that the FCC is to evaluate
the enumerated factors nor prescribes the relative weight the FCC
122
is to accord each factor.
The Act directs the Commission to adopt rules establishing
"fair and expeditious procedures" for receiving, considering, and
resolving complaints from "any subscriber, franchising authority,
or other relevant State or local government" entity alleging that
rates for cable programming services are unreasonable. 123 The
subscribers and local authorities are given standing to file a
complaint based upon a "minimum showing."' 24 Significantly,
118. Id.
119. 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(c)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1993).
120. 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(c)(2) (West Supp. 1993).
121. Id.
122. The FCC has determined that it will apply a "reasoned balancing of the statutory
factors" and that it will give primary weight to the rates of systems subject to effective
competition. Rate Order,supra note 2, para. 387. Consequently, the FCC has decided
to apply to premium rates the same benchmark system and formulas it will use to
regulate basic rates. Id. par. 396.
123. 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(c)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1993).
124. See id. This standard was adopted in Conference in lieu of the language in both
the Senate and the House bills that would have required that a complaint demonstrate
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complaints may be filed against existing premium service rates
and need not await a rate increase, but such complaints about
existing rates may only be filed within 180 days of the effective
date of rate regulation." 5 In contrast, complaints about rate
increases must be filed within "a reasonable period of time"
following a change in rates, including a change in rates resulting
26
from a retiering charge.
F.

Effective Competition
An oddly cut cornerstone, the statutory definition of effective
competition,127 supports the entire regulatory structure of the
Act. Section 3 of the Act provides that a cable system faces
"effective competition" and therefore is not subject to FCC rate
regulations 28 if (1) fewer than 30 percent of the households in
the franchise area subscribe to the service of a cable system; (2)
the cable system and another unaffiliated multichannel distributor
each offers comparable programming to at least 50 percent of the
households in the franchise area, and 15 percent of the households
actually subscribe to multichannel distributors other than the
largest distributor; or (3) the local franchising authority itself
operates a multichannel distributor that offers programming to at
least 50 percent of the households in the franchise area.12 9 Under
this definition, most existing cable systems do not face effective
competition and are subject to rate regulation.

a "prima facie case." H.R. CoNF. No. 862, supra note 63, at 64, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1246.
125. 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(c)(3) (West Supp. 1993). This provision was adopted from
the House bill, in place of the Senate proposal to permit complaints only about rate
increases. H.R. CONF. No. 862, supra note 63, at 65, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1247.
126. 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(c)(3) (West Supp. 1993).
127. 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(0(1) (West Supp. 1993). This definition replaces the
definitions of effective competition the FCC adopted pursuant to the 1984 Cable Act.
128. 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(a)(2) (West Supp. 1993). An issue arises as to whether the
exemption applies to more than just regulation of the rates of the basic tier of service
and regulating unreasonable rates of other cable programming services. It could be
argued that an exempted cable operator is not exempt from the related requirements of
Section 3, which deal with uniform rate structure, discriminatory pricing, negative option
billing, etc. At present it is likely this issue will be of limited significance.
129. 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(0(1) (West Supp. 1993).
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The rationale for the first alternative prong of the statutory
definition is not obvious. It is neither intuitively apparent nor
logically possible to deduce how effective competition, under any
fair understanding of what that term might mean, can exist when
fewer than 30 percent of the households in a franchise area
subscribe to cable and there is no other distributor providing a
competitive service. 30 It helps a bit when analyzing the language to realize that statutes often invoke a suspension of the
common meaning of words, and this is a good example of a
statutory purpose taking precedence over Webster's preferred
usage.13 ' That is, the definition of effective competition merely
describes situations for which Congress on policy grounds does
not believe that rate regulation is appropriate; the definition as it
evolved in the legislative process reflected the consensus about
when regulation should be triggered rather than the views of
Congress on the etymology of the term "effective competition."'' 3 In fact, there are two policy rationales for the first part
130. In Senate hearings, the President of the NCTA declined to explain or defend the
logic of the low penetration exemption "because I do not understand the logic of it."
Senate Hearing on S. 12, supra note 86, at 193 (testimony of James P. Mooney). He
elaborated:
If you have more than 50 percent penetration it may be simply as a result of
providing good service, offering a good programming lineup and doing good
marketing. There is nothing to say that above or below 50 percent, or for that
matter any number arbitrarily chosen, is indicative of anything with respect to
market power or competition.
Id. at 193-94.
131. Examples of counterintuitive and perhaps oxymoronic statutory definitions used
to trigger regulatory coverage are not uncommon. See, e.g., United States v. BactoUnidisk, 394 U.S. 784 (1969) (statutory definition of a drug under the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) includes device-like disks). The statutory definition
of "drug" in the FFDCA is intended to broaden coverage of the Act beyond what any
strict medical definition of "drug" might otherwise allow. Nor is it unprecedented for a
federal agency to apply a statutory definition in an odd way. Recall, for example, the
flap over the changes in the school lunch program that would have listed ketchup and
pickle relish as vegetables, doughnuts as bread, and soybean cakes-tofu-as hamburger
meat. See Ward Sinclair, Q: When is Ketchup a Vegetable? A: When Tofu is Meat,
WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 1981, at A7; Mary Thornton & Martin Schram, U.S. Holds the

Ketchup in Schools, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 1981, at Al. Such definitional conundrums
could provide first-year law students a worthwhile lesson on the difficulties of gleaning
rational intent solely on the basis of textual analysis of a statute or a regulation.
132. A cynic might suggest that this prong of the definition is one of the many lamb's
wool-cloaked loopholes foisted by the opponents of the Act to restrict its general
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of the effective competition definition. First, this provision creates
a "safe harbor" from rate regulation in order to encourage the
extension of cable into as yet unwired areas and to encourage the
rapid expansion of cable service within a franchise area. Without
this exemption, arguably the burdens and limitations of rate
regulations might discourage the expansion of cable service to
previously unserved households. 133 Presumably, the authors of
the Act did not want to risk creating new impediments that would
further delay cable service for those Americans in largely rural
areas who have been the last to enjoy the benefits of cable
television. Second, in a franchise area with fewer than 30 percent
of the households subscribing, the local cable operator arguably
has only limited ability to exert monopoly power. In such
situations rate regulation is presumably unnecessary to protect the
public.13 1 It would be a bizarre result of the low penetration
definition if cable systems with over 30 percent penetration were
able to avoid regulation by reducing their penetration. Attempts to
do so through either raising prices or underreporting would, at a

applicability. In fact, the precursor bill in which the exemption for low penetration
systems first appeared had no provision at all that addressed standards for rate
regulations, further indicating that the two concepts-applicability of rate regulation
versus the standards for rate regulation-are distinct. See S. 833, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1989); 135 CONG. REC. 7006-09 (1989) (statement of Sen. Howard Metzenbaum (DOhio)).
133. See, e.g., Senate Hearingon S. 12, supra note 86, at 386-87 (written statement
of USA Cablesystems, Inc.) (rate regulation would have disproportionately adverse effect
on small systems and could interfere with serving remote rural areas); 137 CONG. REC.
S555 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 1991) (statement of Sen. Joseph Lieberman (D-Conn.)). Some
of the possible rationales and consequences of including low penetration systems in the
definition of effective competition are discussed in Rate Order on Reconsideration,supra
note 2, para. 129.
134. However, about 50 to 60% of systems with under 1000 subscribers are affiliated
with cable multisystem operators such as TCI. Meeting with Alexandra Wilson, Cable
Division Acting Chief, FCC (Sept. 7, 1993). Low penetration is attributable to many
factors other than the presence of competition or the absence of monopoly power. See
Hazlett Affidavit, supra note 80, para. 15 (analyzing in detail each of the 79 low
penetration systems falling in the first category of the effective competition definition).
Ironically, the 76 systems surveyed by the FCC that fit the low penetration definition
were found to have higher than average prices. Rate Order,supra note 2, app. E. In fact,
Hazlett calculates that these systems had rates 10% higher than monopoly systems,
Hazlett Affidavit, supra note 80, para. 10, and surmises that high rates are a reason for
low penetration, id. paras. 12, 15.
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minimum, be addressable through the FCC's authority to prevent
evasions.'35
III. CAN THE RENENTION WoRK?
A LOOK UNDER THE HOOD

Before turning to a few of the major issues raised by the
FCC's approach to rate regulation and analyzing whether adjustments might yet be required,'36 it is appropriate to review what
has been accomplished. Even without the new responsibilities of
the 1992 Cable Act, the FCC has a bulging agenda that has
included developing video dialtone rules, considering local
exchange carrier reforms, new regulatory responsibilities for
emerging technologies such as personal communications services, 137 and completely overhauling its licensing procedures by
conducting auctions for spectrum. 38 The Cable Act has added
to that list by giving the FCC the responsibility for twenty-six
additional rulemakings, inquiries, and reports. So far the FCC has
issued on schedule almost fifty separate notices of proposed
rulemakings, report and orders, orders on reconsideration, and
other items relating to the 1992 Cable Act. Only a handful of
these deal with rate regulation.
The scope of the rate regulation rulemaking in itself is
daunting. After issuing the Notice of ProposedRule Making in

135. See generally 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(h) (West Supp. 1993).
136. See, e.g., Rate Order,supra note 2, paras. 2, 10, app. A para. 2; Rate Orderon
Reconsideration, supra note 2, para. 130; id. (separate statements of James H. Quello,
Acting Chairman, FCC, and Andrew C. Barrett, Commissioner, FCC (April 1, 1993));
see also Oversight Hearing, supra note 4 (testimonies of James H. Quello, Acting
Chairman, FCC; Andrew C. Barrett, Commissioner, FCC; and Ervin S. Duggan,
Commissioner, FCC).
137. See In re Telephone Co.-Cable TV Cross-Ownership Rules, §§ 63.54-63.58,
SecondReportand Order,Recommendationto Congress,andSecondNotice ofProposed
Rulemaking, 7 FCC Rcd. 5781 (1992) [hereinafter Video Dialtone Order];see also In
re Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Establish New Personal Comm. Servs.,
Second Report and Order in Gen. Dkt. No. 90-314, FCC 93-451 (Sept. 23, 1993); In re
Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Establish New Narrowband Personal Comm.
Servs., FirstReport and Order, 8 FCC Rcd. 7162 (1993).
138. See In re Implementation of § 309(j) of the Communications Act Competitive
Bidding, Notice of ProposedRulemaking in PP Dkt. No. 93-253, FCC 93-455 (Oct. 12,
1993).
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December 1992, running over one hundred typewritten pages and
twenty pages in the Federal Register, the FCC received extensive
comments from 176 parties, and reply comments from 121
parties.139 The April 1993 Rate Order and its accompanying
materials were 521 typewritten pages and over one hundred pages
in the Federal Register. In this effort the FCC has kept to an
almost impossible statutory timetable. One cannot review the
record of these proceedings without being impressed by the
Commission's painstakingly conscientious consideration of the
plethora of public comments and myriad of issues they raise. The
long hours, the dedication, the professionalism of the individuals
involved in this effort should give pause to even the most vigorous
critics of the federal bureaucracy and in the view of at least this
observer, the responsible FCC staff are hardly overpaid. Perhaps
most significant about this track record is what it indicates about
the determination and ability of the FCC to follow through, and,
if there prove to be unintended consequences of its regulations, to
make changes as needed to achieve the statutory objectives.
A.

The Ten PercentSolution
If unregulated monopoly cable rates were only 10 percent
higher than competitive rates, the 1992 Cable Act never would
have become law. The Act was not about charges of twenty-two
dollars a month rather than twenty, or eleven dollars a month
rather than ten. It was a legislative record depicting much greater
industry-wide disparities, as well as persistent reports of overcharges that propelled Congress to enact rate regulation over
tremendous opposition and to hand President Bush the only veto
override of his presidency. Yet, 10 percent is the difference the
FCC has determined, 4 ' and stuck to upon reconsideration,'41
that existed between monopoly prices and competitive prices. 4
139. Rate Order, supra note 2, app. B.
140. Id. para. 15, app. A para. 5.
141. Rate Order on Reconsideration,supra note 2, paras. 7-13.
142. A discussion of the statutory and policy issues surrounding the FCC's selection
of the 10% standard are found in Rate Order, supra note 2, paras. 171-232, and Rate
Order on Reconsideration, supra note 2, paras. 21-30, 124-131. See also Rate Order,
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The Act directed the FCC to adopt standards that produced
rates reflecting prices consumers would pay in a competitive
marketplace.'43 The FCC did not have data on cable costs or the
rates charged by competitive systems that would be necessary to
determine reasonable rates, and it faced statutory time limits,
which limited its ability to collect this data.
Shortly after enactment of the 1992 Cable Act, even before
issuing the Notice of ProposedRulemaking, the FCC conducted a
survey of a sample of cable systems.'" The Commission surveyed 748 cable systems and received 708 responses, a 94.6
percent response rate, of which 687, or 91.8 percent were deemed
to be usable.145 Of this data base-out of a universe of over
eleven thousand franchise systems with cable and about thirty
thousand different cable community units served by those
systems-there were 141 systems found to meet the statutory
definition of systems subject to effective competition: seventy-nine
fit the first statutory category (franchise areas with less than 30
percent cable penetration), forty-six fit the second category (at
least 50 percent of households passed by both competitors and
more than 15 percent subscribing to the smaller competitor), and
sixteen fit the third category (municipally-owned cable systems or

supra note 2, at 6149-50 nn.6-8 (separate statement of Andrew C. Barrett, Commissioner, FCC).
143. 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(b)(1) (West Supp. 1993).
144. In re Implementation of the Cable TV Consumer Protection and Competition Act
of 1992, Rate Reg., Order, 8 FCC Rcd. 226 (1992) [hereinafter Survey]. The Survey
results and methodology are summarized in Rate Order, supra note 2, app. E. The
components of the survey included (1) a random 1% sample of 300 cable community
units from the universe of active cable community units (29,963); (2) lists of cable
systems competing with other systems compiled from industry data books and trade
associations, including the NCTA and the WCA; (3) a list of low penetration systems
provided by the NCTA from Nielsen Media Research; and (4) cable community units
in the 100 largest cable systems. Id. app. E paras. 1-2 nn.l-5. The methodology and
results were the subject of spirited debate among the commenters and within the
Commission. See id. paras. 472-477; see also id. para. 8; id. at 6148 (separate statement
of Andrew C. Barrett, Commissioner, FCC).
145. Rate Order, supra note 2, app. E para. 8 (420 of the 687 responses included
information about a unique second community unit within the same system, making a
total of 1107 usable community unit responses).
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municipal overbuilds passing at least 50 percent of households).

146

When data from all the systems in the survey were compiled,
including the seventy-nine systems with less than 30 percent
penetration, the competitive differential was calculated at approximately 10 percent. 147 However, when data from systems with
less than 30 percent penetration were excluded from the analysis,
a competitive rate differential of approximately 28 percent was
calculated. This result occurs because many of the low penetration
systems in the first category of the defined instances of effective
competition reported rates that were significantly higher than the
rates of other systems in the survey.148
The issue that has arisen and been debated with some vigor
is whether the FCC went astray by including the low penetration,
noncompetitive systems in its calculations. The debate has largely
focused on whether the FCC could lawfully exclude the data from
its calculations, given the 1992 Cable Act's explicit inclusion of
such systems in its definition of effective competition, and thereby
increase its finding of the competitive differential from 10 percent
to almost 30 percent. The case for excluding the data from such
systems, for including the data and discounting it, or even for
recollecting and reexamining the data is compelling. The Commission set out on a regulatory snipe hunt, searching for chimerical
competitive rates that do not exist, at least not according to
legislative history. If competitive rates did exist to any significant
degree, the statute would never have been enacted. The Commission's difficult statutory challenge is to determine how best to
measure the nonexistent.

146. Id. app. E para. 11.
147., Id. app. E paras. 29-3 1; Rate Orderon Reconsideration,supra note 2, para. 124.
148. Rate Order on Reconsideration, supra note 2, para. 124. Hazlett found these
systems to have prices 10% higher than monopoly rates. Hazlett Affidavit, supra note
80, para. 10. This anomaly is reinforced by the difference between the way penetration
is usually measured, that is, percent of subscribers compared to homes passed--or able
to receive cable-in contrast to the systems that fit the statute's unusual use of
"penetration," percentage of subscribers compared to the entire franchise community
whether wired or not. Id. para. 7.
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The mandatory trigger in the Act for rate regulation is the
statutory three-prong definition of effective competition. Cable
systems that fall within this definition, including low penetration
systems, are exempt from regulation. In contrast, the Act grants
the FCC considerable latitude to fashion regulatory standards for
most cable systems that will achieve basic tier rates that approximate competitive rates and premium tier rates that are reasonable. 149
Congress left to the Commission the task of determining how
to accomplish these objectives. It did not specify any particular
methodology nor did it establish any particular test that the FCC
was required to apply to measure competitive and reasonable rates.
Instead, the Act requires that regulations be designed that "take
into account" seven enumerated statutory factors, one of which is
"the rates for cable systems, ifany, that are subject to effective
competition."' 50 Nothing in the text of the Act or the legislative
history instructs the FCC to place more or less weight on any of
the enumerated factors in fashioning regulations. Indeed, nothing

149. The FCC's analysis is unpersuasive, that its hands are tied by ACLU v. FCC,
823 F.2d 1554 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that the statutory definition of basic cable
service was itself clear and unambiguous and would not be overridden by legislative
history), cert. denied sub nom., Connecticut v. FCC, 485 U.S. 959 (1988). See Rate
Order on Reconsideration,supra note 2, para. 127 (suggesting that the Commission has
authority to redefine basic service).
In contrast, the present debate does not concern altering or reinterpreting the
statutory definition of effective competition. Once the FCC determines that regulation
is required by the statutory definition, the lawfulness of the FCC's calculation of
competitive rates hinges on whether its methodology and the weight it gives to various
factors is reasonable, is based on substantial evidence, and can withstand a challenge
asserting that the results are arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of the agency's
discretion. In other words, did the FCC, exercising its administrative expertise, give
serious consideration to all relevant data and argument? See KENNETH CULP DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY §§ 16.05, 29.02, 29.03 (1958). Was
there arbitrary and capricious action that patently refuted the premise of agency
expertise? Id.; see also STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE 288-90 (1979).
150. 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(b)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1993) (emphasis added). This point also
applies to the several factors the FCC is instructed to consider in regulating premium
rates. 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(c)(2). The Commission has decided to give primary weight to
one factor-the rate changes by competitive systems-and to essentially calculate
reasonable premium rates the same way it does basic. Rate Order, supra note 2, para.
180.
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in the language of the Act mandates that all the factors, much less
every element of one factor-systems facing effective competition-be weighted equally as the Commission implements its rate
setting requirements."' Accordingly, the FCC concluded correctly that
our regulations will satisfy the standard established in the statute (1)
if they establish a measure of reasonableness that takes each factor,
including the rates of systems subject to effective competition, into
account and (2) if, overall, they are designed to "protect" subscribers from paying rates for their cable service that are higher than if
the service were subject to effective competition.'52

The Commission had several options regarding how to take
competitive prices into account, none of them satisfying. First,
because instances of competition are so rare, and any attempt to
measure actual competition so problematic, the Commission could
have examined cost data and determined from the data what
competitive rates would be. Another option, not required,
suggested, or foreclosed by the Act is to review prior regulated
rates, those allowed prior to deregulation under the 1984 Act, and
project forward, allowing for inflation, and other factors to
determine what a current competitive price would look like.
Ultimately, the Commission determined that it should rely upon
current rate data as a starting point to calculate benchmarks for
both competitive and reasonable prices.'53 This was, at best, an
elusive task. Without becoming too scientific about sampling sizes,
it is nevertheless possible to recognize that the instances of
competitive services are so few and far between as to provide a
survey that cannot in itself be definitive. Certainly, each of the
relatively few situations where competition has arisen must be
54
somewhat idiosyncratic and therefore statistically suspect.

151. See Rate Order, supra note 2, para. 179.

152. Id.
153. Id. paras. 475-477.
154. See Hazlett Affidavit, supra note 80, para. 5 (with accompanying data entitled
Summary of Systems attached). The NCTA was virtually the only commenter to find the
FCC's survey data to be useful and reliable, and even it submitted an economic paper
suggesting how to clean up the data. NCTA Database Comments, supra note 37 (with
preliminary analysis of survey data by Economists, Inc. attached).
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The Act does not require the FCC to survey the rates of low
penetration systems. After having done so, the Act can hardly be
read as constraining the Commission's responsibility to evaluate
the data and determine its weight, if any, in calculating reasonable
rates. The Commission has already exercised its expertise in this
manner in several ways, which belies the pretense that it lacks the
statutory discretion to discount the survey rates of the low
penetration systems. For example, the FCC determined how many
and which communities to survey, and elected not to consider
many responses that it found were unusable. 155 The FCC also
has not, for obvious reasons, included in its calculations any factor
for completely unwired areas that also fit the definition of low
penetration systems."' The FCC might have just as plausibly
concluded that the data from the seventy-nine low penetration
systems it surveyed were unrepresentative of the vast majority of
low penetration systems where there is no cable service, and
declined to use it on that basis. Put another way, the FCC would
have been well within the zone of statutory compliance by
examining the low penetration systems and concluding, based on
the record, that there was no reliable basis
for calculating a
57
competitive price level in those situations.
The controversy and attendant publicity over the 10 percent
calculation has obscured the fact that there are several separate
steps in the FCC's determination of initially permitted regulated
rates. Each of these steps needs to be carefully scrutinized in order
to determine whether in practice it is causing or exacerbating
155. Rate Order,supra note 2, app. E paras. 8-13.
156. Every unwired area in the country not served by a cable system fits the strict
definition of a "low penetration" system. By choosing not to consider those unwired
situations in its calculations, the FCC has demonstrated the discretion it has to interpret
and apply the statutory definition so as to avoid absurd results.
157. Another approach would be to use the figures from low penetration systems in
determining separate benchmarks and required reduction for certain classes of systems
subject to rate regulation, rather than including the data in the calculations for all
systems. It may be possible to match up the low penetration systems with categories of
regulated systems on the basis of population (where number of subscribers is less than
1000), recent status as a low penetration system, or other market characteristics. The
challenge in pursuing this approach would be to ensure that it did not unfairly delay or
diminish the benefits of rate regulation for any category of subscribers.
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unintended consequences. Fine tuning the rate regulation may well
involve more than adjusting the level of the 10 percent differential.
1.

Are the Benchmarks Too High?
The FCC has decided to rely on a benchmark approach to
implement rate regulation for cable systems not facing effective
competition.' 58 Regulated systems are required to use a formula
to compare their current rates to an appropriate benchmark of rates
a competitive system would charge.' 59 A regulated system's
benchmark is the rate that a cable system facing competition
would charge with the same number of subscribers, same number
of channels, and same number of satellite channels. The benchmarks are based on the FCC's survey data, which produced 141
responses from cable systems deemed to satisfy the statutory
effective competition definition. 60 Given that the benchmark
system is the foundation of the new rate regulatory regime, it is
critically important for subsequent survey data to be examined to
test the accuracy of the benchmarks, and for them to be revised as
necessary. Moreover, as competition grows over time, the
1 61
reliability of the sample should improve.
Two twists in the FCC's benchmark system act as brakes on
rate reductions. First, rates at or below the benchmark level are
presumed to be reasonable, and no reductions are required for such
below-benchmark rates at the time the system becomes subject to
regulation, even if the rates have increased since enactment.1 62

158. Rate Order,supra note 2, para. 199.
159. Id. para. 215. Subsequently, increases are determined by price caps above the
initial regulated rate, which in turn is based on the benchmark, so later adjustments of
the initial benchmarks could, prospectively, have an impact on the level of increases that
would eventually be permitted in newly-regulated systems if the price caps were adjusted
accordingly.
160. Id. app. E para. 11.
161. Ongoing correction of the benchmarks will remain worthwhile for all regulated
systems because there is no time limit on when a local authority can file its certification
to initiate regulation, and complaints about premium service may be filed after any
future increase, within a reasonable time.
162. Rate Order, supra note 2, para. 216; see also id. para. 219 (discussing rates
below benchmarks on Sept. 30, 1992, but above benchmark on date regulation begins;
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The higher the benchmarks, the fewer the number of situations
where either a rate reduction will be required or the cable operator
will need to try to qualify for a cost-of-service exception. Also,
the higher the benchmark, the larger the rate increase that can be
charged by a regulated system without triggering a mandatory
reduction.
Second, with respect to rates that exceed a cable system's
comparable competitive benchmark, the required reduction for
these presumptively unreasonable rates is to be only to the
benchmark-and no more. This approach compounds any
miscalculation that might have been made in determining the
competitive differential (10 percent), which is the maximum
amount of reduction that will be required.163 Subscribers of
regulated systems might receive a 10 percent reduction, but they
could receive less or none if the benchmarks are set too high.
Are the Per Channel Rate Calculations Being Manipulated?
In order to compare their current rates with the benchmark
rates, cable operators must calculate their current per channel rate
according to a formula detailed by the FCC in forms and worksheets provided for this purpose. 64
For the sake of analysis, the essence of the required calculation can be summarized in three equations:
2.

" Current rate
per channel

(monthly revenues)
(number of channels)

"Monthly revenues

programming + equipment (recovered franchise fees)

required reduction limited to benchmark and increases up to benchmark may be
retained).
163. The stated justification for making the benchmark the floor for rate reductions
is to avoid cost-of-service showings that might otherwise result. Rate Order,supra note
2, para. 219.
164. See id. para. 215 n.541; see also id. app. D (FCC Form 393, Worksheets 1
through 6 (Request for Rate Approval)).
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(total number of basic)
+
16
(premium channels) 1

The cable operator divides the total monthly revenues by the total
number of channels on both basic and cable programming
tiers. 166 To compute total revenues, equipment revenues are
added to programming revenues, because they are to be compared
to benchmarks, which are based on the survey data base that
included equipment revenues.6 7 Revenues collected to offset
franchise fees are subtracted out because the benchmark survey
data did not include franchise fees. 68 The resulting per channel
rate is then compared to the appropriate competitive benchmark.
The rate per channel calculation is intended to be tier neutral
in that it is an average across all channels on all tiers. However,
it is apparent that the per channel rate can be reduced without
lowering or raising rates by increasing the number of channels, to
the extent a cable system has additional unused channel capacity.
It will be important to determine whether or not this is occurring,
and to assess whether the additional channels are an enhancement
of the programming offering or merely what some colorfully
describe as extra "fireplace networks," channels nobody wants to
69
watch, like one showing burning logs twenty-four hours a day.
3.

Should Equipment Charges Be Included in the Rate Per
Channel Computation?
Under the formula for computing current rates, the numerator
is determined by adding equipment charges to charges for the
basic tier. The Act describes a separate method for determining

165. Id. app. D at 6094-104 (FCC Form-Part II, Worksheets and Instructions for
Calculating Maximum Initial Permitted Rates for Regulated Cable Programming
Services).
166. Both the components of revenues in the numerator and the components of
number of channels are weighted to reflect the number of subscribers relating to each
component. Id. app. D at 6098 (instructions for completing line 104 of Worksheet 1).
167. Id. para. 215 n.541.
168. Id.
169. Hazlett, supra note 5. But see Duggan, supra note 4; Oversight Hearing,supra
note 4 (statement of Ervin S. Duggan, Commissioner, FCC) (discussing indications that
quality channels are being added in service offerings).
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regulated rates for equipment used by subscribers to receive the
basic tier of service. Unlike the statutory language pertaining to
basic programming, equipment charges must be based on actual
cost.17 Consequently, under the new rate regulations, in many
if not most situations, current equipment charges will fall
dramatically-far more than 10 percent. If these charges are made
as they must be, and the reduced equipment charge is included in
the calculation of current rates, then the computation of the rate
per channel will be reduced relative to the benchmark without
reducing the rate for basic. This in turn may permit significant
increases in current rates for basic programming without exceeding
the benchmark. The April Freeze Order would not preclude such
increases because the calculated average monthly rate would not
increase. This scenario might prove to be the explanation for the
recent numerous reports of rising basic rates. It might also be the
cause of the perception that subscribers with the most lavish
contracts featuring equipment add-ons and multiple sets are
enjoying the largest savings, while those receiving the least
expensive service are experiencing the brunt of price increas17 1
es.
This result is hardly required by the Act. In fact a powerful
case can be made that Congress intended above all else that all
rates charged would approximate competitive rates-that unreasonable basic rates be reduced to reasonable levels and equipment
charges be reduced to levels reflecting actual cost. The FCC is

170. 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(b)(3) (West Supp. 1993). Another way of looking at the
different statutory treatment is that Congress intended that rates for both programming
and equipment approximate reasonable competitive rates. This may be done more readily
for equipment because the cost to the cable system of equipment is relatively simple to
determine. It is the cost the cable system pays to the manufacturer to purchase the
equipment. In contrast, Congress gave the FCC greater latitude in determining how to
calculate competitive rates for programming.
171. It is estimated that between 6% and 9% of subscribers nationwide subscribe to
the "stripped down" basic service. Oversight Hearing,supra note 4 (statement of James
H. Quello, Acting Chairman, FCC). Speculation that these subscribers are predominately
low income and fixed income households experiencing a disproportionate share of rate
increases under the new regulations raises concerns about the fairness of the regulations.
This trend could also be exacerbated by the weighting the calculations give according
to the number of subscribers.
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required to determine and attribute equipment charges that relate
to the use of basic service as distinguished from equipment
charges that relate to the use of premium service.' 72 However,
nothing in the Act requires the FCC to calculate per channel rates,
much less to do so in a manner that factors in equipment charges
when calculating any required reductions for either basic or
premium programming. This issue should, and no doubt will, be
a priority for the FCC as it examines ways to adjust the regulations to assure greater fairness and to uphold the objectives of the
Act.173
4.

Is Ten Percent Enough?
Only in the context of all of the foregoing computations is it
possible to get a clear picture of whether a 10 percent reduction
of unreasonable rates that exceed the benchmark is sufficient to
yield rates that approximate competitive rates. The level of the
percentage reduction is in itself especially important because the
FCC has determined that 10 percent will be the maximum
reduction required.' 74 In many instances, rates above the benchmark even for the "outlier" systems, where rates far exceed
competitive rates, will have regulated rates that remain above the
benchmark. 7 Accordingly, good reasons exist for detennining
whether 10 percent is adequate to achieve the statutory objective
and whether there should be different percentages, just as there are
different benchmarks, to meet a variety of different categories of
cable systems. In any event, the need and impact of such a change
cannot be gauged accurately without reference to the other parts
of the formula that has been established to regulate rates.

172. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 543()(2) (West Supp. 1993). This statutory definition of
"cable programming service" includes the "installation or rental of equipment used for
the receipt of such video programming . . . " Id. Thus, cable programming rate
complaints may involve allegations of unreasonableness with respect to charges for
equipment installation and rent. Rate Order,supra note 2, para. 330 n.810.
173. A better benchmark data base or an adjustment to current benchmarks would
permit eliminating equipment charges from the per channel rate calculation.
174. Rate Order, supra note 2, para. 219.
175. The FCC's approach is asymmetrical in the sense that systems below the
benchmark can raise rates up to the benchmark.
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B.

FillingRegulatory Vacuums
When the need to regulate rates is felt at the local level, rates
will be regulated even if the local authority is unable to do so
itself. In many respects, the Act imposes shared responsibilities on
both the FCC and the local franchising authority for the basic
service tier. For example, before the basic service tier can be
regulated locally, the franchising authority must comply with FCC
rules. 17 6 The FCC is explicitly required to regulate basic rates
when a local franchising authority has been disapproved for
certification or, if its certification has been revoked, until the local
authority requalifies."' The Act, however, is silent as to whether
the FCC is to regulate in the first instance should the local
franchising authority choose not to file for certification.17
The FCC concluded that it will initiate regulation of basic
service in certain circumstances when the local franchising
authority does not itself assert regulatory jurisdiction over basic
service.179 The Commission took this action in order to fulfill its
overriding obligation "to protect subscribers of any cable system
that is not subject to effective competition," ' and because it
concluded that Congress did not intend to create a regulatory
vacuum in cases where a local authority was unable to obtain
certification.' 8 '
The FCC has stressed that local authorities are to be the
primary regulators of basic rates. The FCC will not, therefore,
assume jurisdiction in all cases where a local franchising authority
does not apply for certification. It will not, for example, step in or
override a local decision not to regulate rates if the local authority
affirmatively opposes rate regulation. On the other hand, where a
local authority cannot meet the certification standards, particularly
when it does not have the resources to administer rate legislation

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

47 U.S.C.A. § 543(a)(2)-(3) (West Supp. 1993).
47 U.S.C.A. § 543(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1993).
See Rate Order,supra note 2, para. 53 n.166.
Id. paras. 17, 53.
Id. para. 53 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP.No. 862, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 62).
Id.
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or the legal authority to do so, the FCC will regulate. The FCC
has struck a reasoned and careful balance. It will presume that
local authorities receiving franchise fees have the resources to
regulate. Any such authority requesting the FCC to regulate in its
stead is required to rebut this presumption by demonstrating why
the franchise fees it obtains cannot be used to cover the cost of
rate regulation.182 The FCC also will not regulate basic rates
where a local authority voluntarily chooses not to seek certification because it is satisfied with the rates charged by the local cable
183
operator.
Those decisions about how to share regulatory responsibility
could have a major impact on determining how many communities
and how quickly local rates are regulated. The decisions will help
to assure that the regulatory vacuum created by the 1984 Act now
can be filled, even in instances where for a variety of reasons local
governments are unable or slow to initiate regulation. It will take
time for local franchising authorities to master the complexities of
the regulatory regimes and to determine whether they can legally
exercise jurisdiction over their local rates. Ultimately, however,
the success of rate regulation will depend on a great deal of the
work being performed at the local level. Commissioner Duggan
drove this point home in a recent speech before the National
Association of Telecommunications Officers and Advisors:
The statute, we need to remember, gives you the prerogative of
declining to regulate rates locally. If you choose to exercise that
prerogative, I would caution you not to expect the Commission to
do the job for you. We will be busy regulating the services over
which we have exclusive jurisdiction. I would urge you, therefore,
to think carefully about the implications of forbearing from
regulation locally.'84

While the tandem arrangement in the statute for regulatory
responsibility may have some practical advantages, it further
complicates the intricacies of the new rate regulation system. At

182. Id. paras. 17, 55-56.
183. Id. para. 17.
184. Duggan, supra note 4, at 6; see also Edmund L. Andrews, Enforcement
ProblemsMay Help Cable Systems Sidestep Rate Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1993, at
Al; Farhi, Few Localities Regulate Cable Rates, supra note 18.

Number 1]

RATE REGULATION

a minimum, a significant period of adjustment and experience will
be necessary to determine whether the regime implemented by the
FCC under the 1992 Cable Act can be made more workable and
will yield regulated rates that approximate rates in a competitive
marketplace.
C.

Getting It Simpler
The rate regulations are too complicated. That is a description
about a work in progress, not a statement of blame. No doubt if
the FCC had longer, it would have been shorter.'85 While the
docket items relating to the rulemaking, the NPRM, the Rate
Order, the Orders on Consideration, and related items and
comments are voluminous,"' the actual regulations and the
accompanying forms and worksheets are not impenetrable.
Moreover, the initial phase of rate regulation, computing the base
level of initially permitted rates, should prove to be the most
confusing and most complex stage of regulation. Once rate caps
begin to determine subsequent rate levels, the procedure should
become appreciably more routinized. More work remains to be
done, however, to simplify the process further.
At a time when the Clinton Administration is holding Rose
Garden press conferences about putting government regulation on
a diet,8 7 the FCC should be understandably sensitive about

185. Although he has often been misquoted, it is doubtful that Lincoln ever actually
offered this apology for a long letter. Ralph Keyes, Famous Misquotations, TORONTO
STAR, Dec. 5, 1992, at Dl. It was French philosopher Blaise Pascal who said, "I have
made this letter longer than usual because I lack the time to make it short." JOHN
BARTLETr, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 299 (Emily Morison Beck et al. eds., 15th ed. 1980).
186. The rulemaking record and regulations are comparable to the scope of other
significant regulatory proceedings such as the new food labeling regulations under the
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Food Labeling, FinalRule, 58 Fed. Reg.
2079 (1993) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 1, 101). Nor is regulatory girth a recent
phenomenon. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'd sub
nom. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983) (discussing new source
performance standards for coal fired steam generators); BRUCE A. ACKERMAN &
WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981).
187. See Al Gore, From Red Tape to Results, Creating a Government that Works
Better & Costs Less, Report of the National Performance Review, reprinted in U.S.
Newswire, Sept. 7, 1993, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File; see also Cindy
Skrzycki, Riled About Cable Rates? You'd Best Be in Good Form, WASH. POST, Nov.
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issuing cable regulations that require their own forklift. The Act
is also quite explicit about simplification. The very first, and one
of the only, guidelines in the statute for the content of the
regulations for basic rates is that the FCC "shall seek to reduce the
administrative burdens on subscribers, cable operators, franchising
authorities, and the Commission."'88 This language should be
taken as an ongoing proscription, not completely discharged upon
issuance of the regulations.
The rulemaking record suggests two factors that have
contributed, with some irony, to the complexity of the regulations.
The first is a strong aversion to a cost-of-service type of ratemaking. The second is the attempt to keep local authorities on a
tight rein, enforcing a degree of uniformity by specifying great
detail in the regulations and thereby narrowing the discretion of
local franchise authorities.
The cable industry vigorously advanced these regulatory
principles during rulemaking. Many of the twists, turns, and sharp
points in the resulting regulatory briar patch respond to these
concerns. The resulting thicket is one in which the industry, at
least the larger players, are quite comfortable, notwithstanding
complaints about unnecessarily burdensome regulation to the
contrary. 189
The FCC's apparent interpretation of the statutory directive
to reduce administrative burdens is that it must not, to the extent
possible, engage in cost-of-service ratemaking. At the outset of the
Rate Order,the FCC pointedly noted that the Communications Act
continues to provide, as it has since 1984, that cable systems
"shall not be subject to regulation as a common carrier or utility
by reason of providing any cable service."19' This theme is
repeated throughout the Order in many different ways. The FCC

23, 1993, at Cl.
188. 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(b)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1993).
189. Indeed, the regulatory model of benchmarks and comparative differentials
adopted by the FCC closely tracks the approach proposed by the NCTA in its comments.
See Initial NCTA Database Comments, supra note 37; NCTA Database Comments,
supra note 37.
190. Rate Order, supra note 2, para. 8 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 541(c) (1988)).
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adopted its benchmark and price caps mechanism as the primary
method for regulating rates, with cost-of-service procedures
invoked only secondarily if cable operators seek to justify a higher
rate. 191 The FCC also refused to allow local authorities to use
cost-of-service regulation if they chose.192 In specifying the
initial price cuts that will be required for systems with current
rates above the benchmark, the FCC declined to require reductions
for all such systems down to the applicable benchmark, but instead
only by 10 percent if that were lower.1 93 The stated reason is
revealing: "[requiring reductions to the benchmarks] would ignore
the possibility that some systems' high rate may be based at least
in part on higher costs, thus encouraging unweildy [sic] and
expensive cost-of-service showings." 94
While the disadvantages of cost-of-service regulation are
discussed throughout the record, the problem cited most prominently by the FCC is "it imposes heavy burdens upon regulators
and regulatees because of the significant administrative and
compliance costs associated with the regulatory model."' 95 One
cannot help but wonder the extent to which this motive colored
many different decisions within the Commission during the
rulemaking, including the decision to set the competitive differential at 10 percent. With initial reductions of only no more than 10
percent, resulting in many cases with regulated rates still above
the benchmarks, the number of cost-of-service proceedings would
be far fewer than if the required reduction was in the 20 to 30
percent range, which other sources indicate more accurately
represents the differential between monopoly and competitive
prices.
Another source of regulatory complexity is the amount of
specific direction the FCC provides about how the local authorities
must regulate rates. The 1984 Act responded to the cable indus191. Id. paras. 181-188 (discussing advantages ofbenchmarking over cost-of-service).
192. Id. paras. 189-191.
193. Id. para. 219; see id. paras. 390-396 (applying the same rule to unreasonable
premium service rates).
194. Id. para. 219.
195. Id. para. 186.
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try's concerns that uneven, unnecessary, and often excessive local
regulation curtailed its growth and vitality.' 96 The Commission
seems intent not to reinvent regulation that returns to those
problems.197 Consequently, the regulations provide fairly precise
marching orders to the local franchise authorities concerning how
to proceed. The good news is that the regulations are very
detailed-the local authorities need not fashion rules out of whole
cloth. The bad news is that the regulations are very detailed-local
authorities will need, at least initially, to work hard to absorb and
learn the mechanics of the new system.
IV.

OPTIONS

Evaluating appropriate regulatory actions as the FCC's rate
regulations begin to have an impact is complicated by the newness
of the rate regulations, a lack of comprehensive data about
regulated rates, and the dizzying pace of technological and
business developments in the marketplace.' 98 Contrary to early
press accounts, preliminary survey results seem to be indicating
that large numbers of cable subscribers-perhaps 70 percent-are
already enjoying lower prices, even before price caps take
effect.1 99 Although this evidence would indicate that the regulations are working, it is unlikely to completely satisfy Congress,
state and local authorities, and consumers. This is because there
apparently are, contrary to the intent of Congress, rate increases
occurring for a significant number of consumers and complaints
are likely to continue. It is also likely that the regulations are
having unintended consequences. For example, the FCC should

196. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 521(6) (1988). One of the purposes of the 1984 Act was
to "promote competition... and minimize unnecessary regulation that would impose an
undue economic burden on cable systems." H.R. RaP. No. 628, supra note 63, at 10.
197. See, e.g., Rate Order,supra note 2, para. 6.
198. The Bell Atlantic Corp./Tele-Communications, Inc. transaction is one of the
more recent, dramatic examples. See The Cable-PhoneRevolution, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19,
1993, at A14 (editorial); Geraldine Fabrikant, Bell Atlantic's Acquisition Presentedas
a Quantum Leap, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1993, at D11; Paul Farhi & Cindy Skrzycki, Bell
Atlantic, Cable TV Giant Joining Forces, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 1993, at Al.
199. Paul Farhi, New FCCRules Cut Most Cable Tv Bills; Fears ThatLaw Backfired
DissipateSurvey Indicates, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 1993, at Al.
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determine whether or not subscribers on low or fixed incomes are
bearing the brunt of rate increases of basic services, while
subscribers who can afford luxury high-option packages are
enjoying considerable savings. It is also possible that cable
systems are manipulating the complex formulas adopted by the
FCC in a way that, with restructured service offerings, more "a la
carte" offerings, new kinds of charges, and other devices that,
although perhaps technically legal, minimize the benefits of rate
regulation and frustrate the intent of Congress."' Determining
the best course of future regulatory action will only be possible
through the FCC's cable bureau keeping abreast of such practices
and devising more accurate ways of measuring cable rate changes.
A.

Policy Framework
Future decisions about rate regulation should also be
considered in the context of an overall framework for communications policy, rather than in an isolated and reactive manner. It is
possible to suggest an illustrative set of principles for communications policy that is both consistent with congressional intent
underlying the Cable Act of 1992 and the Administration's
telecommunications and overall domestic agenda:20 '
- Competition in the markets of voice, data, and video
is the preferred way to stimulate economic growth
and to provide consumers with reasonable prices and
choices. However, in many of the relevant markets,

200. This possibility was raised by Acting Chairman James H. Quello in his recent
testimony. See Oversight Hearing,supra note 4; see also Andrews, supra note 5, at C1
(reporting FCC Acting Chairman Quello's concern about valuable loopholes in the law).
The FCC's most recent survey found that 11 of the largest 25 cable MSOs had engaged
in significant increases in a la carte offerings making price comparisons difficult. Action
in Docket Case-FCCAnnounces PreliminaryResults of Cable Rate Survey (MM Dkt.
No. 92-266), FCC News, Oct. 21, 1993 (At the time of this writing the FCC had not
issued its final report.).
201. See INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, THE NATIONAL INFORMATION

INFRASTRUCTURE: AGENDA FOR ACTION (Sept. 15, 1993) [hereinafter NII]; see also BILL
CLINTON & AL GORE, PUTINTG PEOPLE FIRST (1992). See also the agenda espoused by

House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance Chairman Markey in his
speech to the United States Telephone Association's Annual Convention. Markey, USTA
Statement, supra note 12.
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including cable video programming sales to consumers, interim regulation is necessary both to constrain
monopoly pricing and practices, and also to nurture
the development of competitive markets. °2
Communications policy should promote universal
access to affordable and fairly priced communications
services. The private sector should be encouraged to
accomplish this objective through investment in
creating an advanced broadband communications
network built upon the existing infrastructure of
coaxial cable, fiber-optic cable, copper wire, as well
as satellite and wireless technology. This network
will promote economic growth and permit the
universal delivery of many commercial and noncommercial services such as health care, training, and

202. Both the rate regulation section of the 1992 Cable Act, 47 U.S.C.A. § 543 (West
Supp. 1993), and the fair access to programming sections, 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 536, 548
(West Supp. 1993), are examples of such interim regulation.
According to Chairman Markey:
My overarching policy objective has been to create jobs and choices for
the American people. For this reason I have consistently opposed monopolies
and worked to rein in monopoly power and abuses wherever they arise. Why?
Because monopolies limit choices. Monopolies retard technological development. Monopolies do not avail consumers of the lowest prices and highest
quality.
Competition has consistently been the preferred vehicle toward bringing
affordable and high quality telecommunications technologies to the American
consumer.
One of the things people don't realize is that you first have to create the
marketplace. Congress and the courts and the FCC createdthe long distance
marketplace through the antitrust case and a series of public policy decisions
designed to promote the viability of competitors to AT&T. Congress and the
FCC created the cellular industry by giving it the necessary breathing room on
the airwaves. Congress had to force telephone companies to give the cable
industry access to telephone poles by passing a law. Congress, with the
passage of the Cable Act of last year which banned exclusive franchises and
gave potential competitors access to video programming, will essentially create
the Direct Broadcast Satellite industry. And the bill that John Dingell,
chairman of the full committee, and I recently passed to reallocate 200
Megahertz of radio frequency spectrum will help to create the PCS industry
and promote competition between PCS and cellular-two byproducts of
government intervention to create markets and industries.
Markey, USTA Statement, supra note 12, at 1-3.
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education opportunities. The new advanced network
should reach all Americans and the service should be
at affordable prices. 3
- In light of accelerating change and dramatic convergence in the marketplace, policy should be flexible
and comprehensive. Technologically specific regulation and ad hoc reactive decisions will neither keep
abreast of market developments nor promote a
breakthrough to a new model of competition among
traditionally discrete communications technologies.
Such a breakthrough would probably require further
legislation.
B.

Accelerate Competition
Under these principles the most attractive option is to take
steps to accelerate the arrival of competition in the subscription
television market. There is already considerable activity underway
in this direction. First, momentum is building to remove obstacles
that prevent the regional Bell Operating Companies from competing with cable television. Last year, the FCC issued rules that
telephone companies could act as common carriers of video

programming owned by others. 204 Further, in August 1993 a

federal district court struck down the 1984 Cable Act's restriction
barring telephone companies from entering the cable television
business in their telephone service areas.2 °5 Subsequently, the
court ruled that the decision only applied to the instant case and
could not be relied upon by other regional Bell Operating
Companies. 0 6 In the meantime, momentum is building in

203. See, e.g., NI, supra note 201, at 6-12; CLINTON & GORE, supra note 201, at 9,
10, 144; Markey, USTA Statement, supra note 12. It is axiomatic that monopoly pricing
and restricted output go hand in hand. To the extent that programming prices are
lowered, programmers will have the incentive to sell to more subscribers, thus advancing
the principle of universal access at affordable prices.
204. See Video Dialtone Order,supra note 137.
205. Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909
(E.D. Va. 1993).
206. Gautum Naik, Judge Says Bell Atlantic Cable Ruling Doesn't 4pply to Other
Phone Carriers,WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 1993, at B6.
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Congress to enact telco entry legislation.2 °7 The Clinton Administration will soon confront the decision of whether or not to
endorse telco entry, and if so, on what terms such entry will be
permitted. On a parallel fast track are the numerous new combinations of communications companies, including telco and cable
mega-deals such as the US West/Time Warner deal, NYNEX's
$1.2 billion investment in Viacom, Bell Atlantic's acquisition of
TCI, and the BellSouth/PrimeCable transaction. Some observers
are questioning whether this spate of corporate marriages will
preempt any competitive battle between cable and telco, and that
just as Congress acts, oligopoly will emerge rather than competition. On the other hand, it is just as possible that these new, more
muscular communications entities are even better equipped to
compete amongst themselves and globally. Federal authorities will
need to scrutinize these deals to determine what their impact will
be on competition.
The FCC also now has the means to push competition from
other multichannel video distributors, such as wireless cable and
the imminent arrival of direct broadcast satellite television. This
can be accomplished through vigorous and efficient enforcement
by the FCC of the 1992 Cable Act provisions assuring fair access
to programming. Simply put, these provisions are designed to
assure that competitors have something to sell.20 8 The FCC has
given programmers until November 15, 1993, to bring their
programming contracts into compliance.2 9 Informal reports seem
to indicate that programmers are doing just that, and that the need
to resort to the new programming complaint process at the FCC
will be atypical. The FCC provides competitors with a simplified
and less costly alternative to litigation for the resolution of

207. See Video Dialtone Order, supra note 137 and accompanying text; see also
Markey, USTA Statement, supra note 12, at 6-7 (endorsing conditional telco entry).
208. See Allard, supra note 63, at 332-33, for an analysis of the access to
programming provisions found in §§ 12 and 19 of the 1992 Cable Act.
209. In re Implementation of §§ 12 and 19 of the Cable TV Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, Development of Competition and Diversity in Video
Programming Distribution and Carriage, First Report and Order, 8 FCC Rcd. 3359
(1993).

Number 1]

RATE REGULATION

disputes over the availability and the price of programming.
Because the prohibitions in the Act are clear, and because it
appears that the FCC will provide swift and certain enforcement
of these provisions, the fair access regulations could well become
self-enforcing as parties assess the risks and bring their conduct
into compliance with the law.
Antitrust enforcement by the Department of Justice, and, as
appropriate, exercise of antitrust authority by the FCC under
Sections 314 and 315 of the Communications Act of 1934,210
can police serious instances of anticompetitive conduct and
provide a useful backstop to the program access provision of the
1992 Cable Act. Finally, the FCC also has authority to prevent
evasion of the rate regulations, which enables it to investigate and
respond to practices in individual cases that are unreasonable.2 1'
Recently the FCC has begun to exercise this anti-evasion authority
by issuing investigative letters of inquiry to certain cable compa2 12
nies.
C.

Regulatory Adjustments
The primary burden to implement the 1992 Cable Act is
squarely on the FCC. Experience may prove that the FCC should
modify its rate regulations. While most attention has been focused
on the appropriateness of the 10 percent reduction required in
some cases for unreasonable rates, and the seductive simplicity of
increasing that figure, there are other elements of the FCC's
formula for rate regulations that should be considered first, should
the case be made that adjustments are necessary.
First, the FCC should periodically review and adjust as
necessary its benchmarks that delineate reasonable rates. The
statute requires the FCC to report yearly on rates.213 This data
will permit the Commission on an ongoing basis to revise the
benchmarks to more accurately reflect truly competitive rates.
210. 47 U.S.C. §§ 314-315 (1988 & Supp. 111 1991).
211. 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(c)(1) (West Supp. 1993).
212. See Press Statement by Chairman James H. Quello (Nov. 16, 1993) (on file with
the Federal CommunicationsLaw Journal).
213. 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(k) (West Supp. 1993).
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There is also ample reason for the FCC to believe that its initial
benchmarks are inaccurate and every effort should be made to
seek appropriate corrections as soon as possible. Second, the FCC
should carefully examine its inclusion of equipment fees and its
use of a per channel rate standard to compute current rates. At a
minimum the FCC should devise a way to remove equipment rates
from the computation in order to get a better measure of reasonable programming rates. In addition, the FCC should consider how
to eliminate the potential for manipulation of its use of a per
channel standard. Systems are able to increase the number of
channels, thus enabling large rate increases without exceeding the
benchmark. Attempting to define and enforce a "quality standard"
as a check on increasing the number of channels to avoid rate
regulation may prove both difficult and futile.
Finally, the FCC should continue to encourage and assist state
and local authorities in fulfilling their primary role of regulating
basic service rates. This will ultimately go a long way toward
easing the Commission's burden of overseeing rate regulation in
almost thirty thousand communities. One consultant to state and
local regulators reports:
The benefits of state ratemaking go beyond the conservation
of resources by the FCC. State commissions are closer to the facts
of an individual system and inherently more capable for making
judgments of financial exigency that provide the only basis to relax
traditional accounting principles. By contrast, the FCC necessarily
deals with policy decisions whose potential consequences must be
"averaged" across the broad range of disparate companies. State
[and local] commissions can provide a company specific review as
needed.
Although state and local jurisdiction is limited to the basic
tier, there are issues of rate design where the local commissioner
can credibly claim to determine preferences that may vary from
state to state. It would be appropriate, for example, to give state
commissions authority to veto moving specific channels from the
basic tier to a federally regulated tier, provided that they allowed
the company to flow through any exogenous changes in programming cost."'

214. AERIE GROUP, supra note 80, at 7.
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The report concludes that:
[S]tate commissions increase the perception and reality of democratic accountability. Where [local authorities] are willing to assume
responsibility for rate regulation, they are closer to the consumer.
The perception of increased accountability is particularly valuable
given the extent to which the complexity and number of cable
companies
forces the FCC to rely on [state and local authori215

ties].

In practice it will be a great challenge for the FCC to strike
a workable balance with local franchise authorities.
CONCLUSION

Spinmasters, a species that thrives in our nation's capital, can
call a horse's tail a leg, but a horse still has four legs. Consumers
know what they pay each month for cable television, and they
know whether their monthly bill goes up or down. Whatever
Jesuitical artifice may convince Washington inside-the-beltway
types that cable rates are just fine, whatever other mega-transactions, lawsuits, landmark court decisions, and new legislation
might divert the attention of official Washington, the issues of
cable rates and quality of service are likely to remain real for the
public.
The FCC's report card should read: Good Start. Full marks
for effort. Room for improvement. The new regulations and the
process of rate regulation are very much a work in progress. The
Commission has kicked off a process of change, and like Horatius
at the bridge, must now continue to hold off excessive rate
increases until competition arrives. The regulated industry will
respond, with energy and ingenuity, and the market is hardly
static; thus, in order to enforce the Act, the FCC must regulate in
an equally fluid and dynamic fashion. Priorities of the Commission
should be, first, to reduce the complexity and the murkiness of the
regulations and, second, to find ways to encourage and support the
state and local authorities in fulfilling their primary role for
regulating basic service rates.

215. Id. at 7-8; see also Duggan, supra note 4.
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The authors of the Act also deserve a good midterm grade.
In hindsight, blessed by short-term memory loss of the tremendous
political struggle involved in enacting the legislation, it might be
said that the provisions could have been better drafted. But in that
case, there might well have been no legislation. Faced with a
choice between perfection and pragmatism, a common legislative
dilemma, Congress opted to try to do something about unregulated
monopoly prices. The features of the Act designed to promote
competition and to regulate rates fit hand in glove together. This
interrelationship is fundamentally the most positive feature of the
Act. One of the best-kept secrets of the new law is how well it is
working to assure that competitors have something to sell. Every
indication is that programmers are making their product available
to competitors and that contracts are being adjusted to offer
nondiscriminatory prices. Use of the new complaint procedures at
the FCC for unfair programming practices might prove to be the
exception to the rule. Rate regulation should reinforce this trend.
When monopoly prices cannot be maintained, it does not make
sense to restrict output. Programmers have every incentive to find
more outlets to sell more products and to make their programming
more universally available at affordable prices. And as competition
emerges, the rate regulation will expire, with no one likely to
mourn its passing.
The experience with reinventing rate regulation for cable
television has significance beyond this sector of the economy. As
the Administration is poised to pursue health care reform, the new
cable regulations are the most recent experiment with attempting
to impose government price controls on a wholly unregulated
industry. The most vivid lesson is that competition is far preferable to the difficulty, cost, and elusive results of rate regulation.
Rate regulation is at best a last resort and the justification must be
very clear. As compared to regulating cable rates, it would seem
that the problems with imposing price controls on the health care
industry would be exponentially more complex.
Recently, the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on
Telecommunications and Finance noted "the tendency to proceed
with debate and deliberation about telecommunications issues as
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if history began in 1984, with the breakup of AT&T and the
passage of the first Cable Act. ' 216 Recent events, the passage of
the 1992 Act, the trend toward technological convergence and
innovation, and the launch of efforts to build an advanced
communications network reaching all Americans, may soon wipe
that slate clean. It is once again a beginning, a time to look
forward to the telecommunications sector reaching its full potential
for stimulating economic growth, generating highly productive
jobs, and providing an array of affordable, advanced services to all
Americans.

216. Markey, USTA Statement, supra note 12, at 1.

